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The power quality performance of South African utilities has been regulated through the 
application of NRS 048-2 standard. The earliest edition of the power quality standard (NRS 048-
2:1996) defines compatibility levels for voltage dips in the form of annual dip limits for each 
voltage dip type. Actual measured utility dip performance has consistently resulted in higher dip 
numbers than the limits imposed in the standard. On the other hand, the dip limits were 
considered to be less restrictive by industrial customers. The revised power quality standard 
addresses the difficulties in managing voltage dip performance based on dip limits as specified in 
the first edition of NRS 048-2. This new philosophy does not define dip limits; instead, utilities are 
required to develop specific strategies to manage dip performance according to customer 
requirements. This research work develops an alternative approach to the management of dip 
performance as opposed to the application of dip limits. The study analyses measured voltage dip 
records for a steel-processing plant and a pulp and paper plant. The supply network for each plant 
is modelled to define dip influence zones as a function of fault locations. The principal results of 
this study are critical circuits, causes of dips, dip influence zones and the key elements of the 
proposed approach in communicating dip performance. The optimised approach was presented to 
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South African electricity utility that generates, transmits and distributes electricity to industrial, 
mining, residential and agricultural customers and redistributors. 
 
Eskom Distribution (or Distribution) 
A business unit within Eskom that operates networks within the voltage range 380V to 132kV 
level. Eskom Distribution interacts directly with residential, mining, industrial and agricultural 
customers and redistributors. Eskom Distribution purchases electricity from Eskom Transmission 
through internal service level agreements. The interface between Distribution and Transmission is 
at specific transmission stations, where voltage is stepped down from transmission voltages 
(765kV – 220kV) to distribution voltages (132kV – 11kV).  
 
Eskom Transmission (or Transmission) 
A business unit within Eskom that operates networks within the voltage range 220kV to 765kV 
a.c. and 533kV d.c. Transmission sells electricity to Distribution through internal service level 
agreements. A relatively small number of customers are supplied directly from Transmission 
instead of being supplied from Distribution (aluminium smelters and some municipalities). 
 
Eskom Customers (or customers) 
‘Customer’ refers to electricity users who purchase electricity from Eskom Distribution or directly 
from Eskom Transmission. In the context of this study, reference to Eskom ‘customers’ excludes 
neighbouring countries to or from which Eskom sells or purchases electricity. 
 
SAPPI 
A global producer of coated fine paper (used in print publications) and cellulose (used in 
pharmaceutical products) and premium quality packaging paper. The paper plant involved in this 
study is situated in Springs (Gauteng province, South Africa). 
 
Scaw Metals 
An international group manufacturing steel products, ranging from rolled steel, wire rope, cast 




   




1.1     POWER QUALITY 
 
Various publications on the subject of power quality use the term power quality with different 
meanings. The following set of definitions has been found to be consistent [1], [2], [3]: 
  Voltage quality is concerned with deviations of the voltage from the ideal. The ideal voltage is 
a single-frequency sinusoidal wave of constant frequency and constant magnitude. 
 Current quality is concerned with deviations of current from the ideal. The ideal current is 
again a single-frequency sinusoidal wave of constant frequency and constant magnitude. An 
additional requirement is that this sine wave is in phase with the supply voltage. 
 Power quality is a combination of voltage quality and current quality.  
 
The definition of power quality is illustrated in figure 1.1. What is noticeable from the stated 
definitions is that power quality refers to the interaction between the utility and the customer, or in 




Figure 1.1: Power quality is a combination of voltage quality and current quality 
 
Power quality disturbances (deviation of voltage or current or both, from the ideal) generally fall 
into two categories [1], [2], namely, variations and events. Figure 1.2 shows the categorization of 
power quality disturbances. 
 
Variations are small deviations of voltage or current from the ideal reference value. Variations are 
disturbances that can be measured at any instant of time. Events are larger deviations that occur 
only occasionally. Events are disturbances that start and end with the crossing of a threshold 
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customers. Customer awareness of power quality issues is increasing due to the more sensitive 
nature of modern electronic equipment and due to the financial losses associated with lost 















Figure 1.2: Power quality disturbances [2] 
 
 
Voltage dips are recognized as one of the most important aspects of power quality [2], [4], [5]. The 
interest in voltage dips originates from the problems they cause on several types of common 
industrial equipment such as variable speed drives, process-control equipment and computers. 
The impact of a voltage dip on industrial processes may not be as severe as that of an 
interruption. However, voltage dips occur much more frequently than interruptions and therefore 
the global impact of dips is still larger [5]. If process equipment is sensitive to these voltage dips, 
the frequency of problems will be much greater than if the equipment were only sensitive to 
interruptions. 
 
The management of voltage dips requires active participation of utilities, customers and 
equipment manufacturers. Utilities around the globe have developed various approaches for 
managing and reporting voltage dip performance [6]. These methods typically quantify dip 
performance by defining specific areas on a magnitude-duration plane that represent guidelines 
on areas where dips are likely to occur, and areas that are likely to affect customers. 
 
The South African utility Eskom performed power quality monitoring throughout its power system 
to obtain statistical information on the expected number of voltage dips and their characteristics 
[6], [7]. These measurement results form the basis for dip categorization according to both the 
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quality standard was introduced as a means of evaluating and regulating the electrical product 
supplied by South African utilities [8]. 
 
1.2     THE SOUTH AFRICAN POWER QUALITY STANDARD 
 
The first edition of the South African power quality standard [8] specifies compatibility levels for 
voltage dips in the form of a maximum number of dips per year for each dip category. The voltage 
dip limits are given for defined network voltage ranges. Table 1.1 reproduced from [8], shows 
voltage dip limits to be considered as minimum compatibility standard. 
 
The assessment method for voltage dips allows for the extreme 5% of measured values to be 
discounted when calculating the assessed level. These assessed values are to be compared with 
voltage dip limits listed in Table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1: Voltage dip limits per year per dip class [8] 
Network Voltage Range Number of Voltage Dips per Year for each Dip Category 
 S T X Y Z 
6.6kV to ≤ 44kV 30 30 100 150 20 
6.6kV to ≤ 44kV Rural 69 54 215 314 49 
> 44kV to ≤ 132kV 25 25 80 120 16 
220kV to ≤ 765kV 11 6 45 88 5 
 
Dip performance studies conducted by Koch, Sigwebela and Geldenhys [7] revealed that actual 
measured dip performance indicates higher dip numbers than the dip limits specified in Table 1.1. 
From the utility perspective, the inability to meet the limits imposed by the power quality standard 
[8] has led to the conclusion that the limits are not achievable without a substantial investment in 
the electricity supply networks [7].  
 
From the customer perspective, the dip limits were considered to be less restrictive, at the time of 
adopting the standard. An expectation was present at the time that a revision of voltage dip 
performance would result in stricter dip limits. Recent improved statistical data shows that the 
compatibility levels need to allow for even more dip events per annum [7]. 
The original dip characterization method developed in [8] was based primarily on theoretical 
considerations. The power quality standard [8] was adopted with an understanding that it will be 
revised after five years of implementation. The standard was based on limited statistical data 
obtained from a limited number of power quality instruments. The availability of monitoring 
instruments was poor, typically failing during lightning seasons when most of the dips would have 
occurred [7]. Moreover, the definition of voltage dip limits has turned out to have a potentially 
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negative effect on some of the customers, as the utility may allow acceptable levels of dip 
performance to deteriorate for the sites that achieve better than acceptable performance.  
 
The National Energy Regular of South Africa (NERSA) recently introduced a new power quality 
management framework through its power quality directive [9]. The principles defined in the power 
quality management framework have been adopted in the revised edition of the power quality 
standard [10]. The initial power quality standard has been revised to overcome the difficulty of 
managing dip performance based on annual dip limits. The revised standard [10] does not specify 
dip limits as minimum compatibility levels. The standard recognises the dependence of voltage 
dip performance on geographical location, network topology and environmental influences.  
 
1.3     QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION STUDY 
 
The development of NERSA’s power quality directive was based on substantial consultation with 
representatives from various stakeholder categories (utilities, customers, equipment suppliers, 
standards bodies, consultants etc) [7]. The consultation process highlighted the specific need for 
each of the parties to appropriately address power quality issues in the design and operation of 
their plant and equipment.  
 
The new framework recognises that dip performance varies from location to location, and that 
customer power quality requirements vary. This realization is addressed in the directive through 
the definition of a quality management system (QMS) as opposed to the application of dip limits. 
The QMS is a regulatory requirement to implement a standard protocol for: 
 Interaction on power quality issues (dips, harmonics, interruptions etc). 
 Communication of power quality issues with customers (rights, complaints processes etc). 
 Customer recourse to mediation or arbitration of disputes by NERSA. 
 
This research work was initiated as a case study to develop an alternative approach to the 
management of voltage dips as opposed to compliance to voltage dip limits. 
  
1.4     RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The current practice in dip performance management requires regular interaction forums between 
Eskom and its industrial customers. The discussions in these forums are centred around the latest 
dip events and specific actions taken by the utility to reduce the number of dips in line with dip 
limits specified in [8]. Initiatives to improve dip performance are largely focussed on the utility 
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perspective. Customer involvement is limited to providing feedback on the impact of each 
recorded dip event in terms of outage duration, financial losses and other difficulties. 
 
The research study examines the following key research question: 
 How can communication of dip performance be optimised with a view to ensuring 
mutual technical responsibility of plant, between the utility and its customers? 
 
1.5     SCOPE OF STUDY 
 
 The study analyses voltage dip performance for a selected set of industrial plants, that is, a 
steel plant and a paper plant (pulp and paper). 
 Voltage dip analysis is performed from both the utility perspective (location, cause etc) and the 
customer perspective (dip-related costs). 
 The supply networks for selected plants are modelled using a power system simulation tool. 
Various fault types are simulated at different points on each supply network to quantify the 
sensitivity of busbar voltage at the customer point of supply. 
 Voltage dip influence zones for each plant are calculated. The results of the analysis and 
simulations were then presented to the customers participating in this study.  
 
1.6     STUDY OBJECTIVES 
 
 To quantify voltage dip performance for the selected industrial plants. 
 To define voltage dip sensitivity zones for the selected plants. 
 To propose and present to the customers, an alternative approach in communicating dip 
performance. 
 
1.7     MOTIVATION 
 
The following drivers have motivated initiation of this work: 
 Requirements of the revised power quality management directive. 
 Mutual dissatisfaction between utility and its customers with the use of dip limits as minimum 
compatibility standards. 
 
1.8     RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
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1.8.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A literature review was conducted to highlight the conceptual framework for the study. Literature 
was sourced in the form of technical publications such as previous research reports, articles, 
textbooks, reports by international organisations (CIGRE, IEEE, IEC) and electronic resources. 
The literature review covered the following areas: 
 Theory of voltage dips inclusive of point-on-wave characteristics, characterization, causes, 
effects and possible solutions to dip problems. 
 Voltage dip modelling techniques. 
 Initial power quality management framework and experience in the South African context. 
 Limitations of the initial framework and introduction of the new approach in power quality 
management. 
 
1.8.2 DIP PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
Voltage dip performance for two industrial plants was analysed (Scaw Metals in Germiston and 
SAPPI in Springs). The choice of industrial plants was primarily based on historical dip-related 
plant downtime for the said plants and willingness to collaborate in finding solutions to dip 
problems. Voltage dip records were obtained from the Eskom quality of supply (QOS) database. A 
window period of three years has been chosen starting from 1st January 2003 to 31st December 
2005. Fault management systems were utilised extensively to determine the root cause of faults 
and to ascertain circuit breaker trip information.  
 
1.8.3 SIMULATION OF VOLTAGE DIPS 
 
Voltage dip simulation was performed using the power system simulation tool DIgSILENT 
PowerFactory. Dip simulations considered different fault types, position of the fault and resultant 
dips at the busbar of interest. Previous results from the QMS series of research studies were 
utilised to calculate dip influence zones.  
 
1.8.4 COMMUNICATION OF DIP PERFORMANCE 
 
The regular Eskom-customer power quality interaction forums were utilised as the platform to 
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1.9     CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
 
The study is organised into a number of chapters, each addressing a specific aspect related to 
voltage dips. 
 
Chapter 2 establishes the conceptual framework for the study by reviewing the theory related to 
voltage dips. The definition of a voltage dip in the context of the study is presented first. The point-
on-wave dip characteristics are briefly discussed followed by a discussion on the causes of 
voltage dips. Various methods of dip characterization are also discussed. Of particular interest is 
the dip characterization method adopted in South Africa. The chapter further analyses the effects 
of voltage dips and presents possible dip mitigation options. The discussion on dip simulation 
techniques includes a brief overview of factors that influence the severity of voltage dips.  
 
The power quality management framework in South Africa has reached important milestones over 
the past decade. Chapter 2 concludes with an examination of the power quality management 
framework in the South African context. The discussion focuses on the initial power quality 
management framework, the experience with power quality monitoring and the new framework. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the power quality monitoring program of Eskom. The causes for recorded 
dips are determined through a dip-to-trip matching exercise. Chapter 3 presents a brief discussion 
on the quality of supply database and reporting tools.  
 
Also introduced in this chapter, are the two industrial plants selected for the case study. The 
analysis of actual measured dip performance for the steel plant and the paper plant is presented.   
 
Chapter 4 discusses dip macros developed for the purpose of simulating voltage dips using the 
DIgSILENT PowerFactory simulation tool. The network model for the selected plants and the 
simulation methods are described. Chapter 4 quantifies the sensitivity of the busbar voltage at the 
customer point of delivery by defining dip influence zones. The dip influence zones are computed 
as a function of fault type.  
 
Chapter 5 presents the key elements of the new proposed strategy of communicating dip 
performance. Chapter 6 analyses the results obtained from dip performance analysis and dip 
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Voltage dips are widely recognised as the single most important power quality phenomenon when 
the number of process interruptions is considered [5]. Several definitions of voltage dips exist, 
differing only in the specification of duration and magnitude thresholds. This chapter reviews 
some of the theoretical concepts associated with voltage dips such as dip characterization, effects 
of dips, possible solutions to dip problems and dip simulation techniques. The South African 
experience with power quality management is also discussed, with particular attention to voltage 
dips. 
 
2.2 THEORY OF VOLTAGE DIPS 
 
2.2.1 DEFINITION OF A VOLTAGE DIP 
 
A voltage dip is defined as a sudden reduction in the r.m.s. voltage, for a period of between 20ms 
and 3s, of any or all of the phase voltages of a single phase or a polyphase supply [8]. Depth 
(magnitude) of a voltage dip is the difference between the declared voltage and the residual 
voltage during a voltage dip event. The duration of a voltage dip is the time measured from the 
moment the r.m.s. voltage drops below 0.9 per unit of declared voltage to the instant when the 
voltage rises above 0.9 per unit of declared voltage. Voltage dip parameters are illustrated 
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If the voltage dip involves multiple phases, the dip duration is defined as the instant when the 
voltage on one phase falls below the dip threshold to the instant when all three phases are again 
above the dip threshold. Similarly the magnitude of the voltage is given by the maximum r.m.s. 
excursion from the declared voltage. 
 
2.2.2 PHASE SHIFT AND POINT-ON-WAVE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
A short-circuit in a power system not only causes a drop in voltage magnitude but also a change 
in phase angle of the voltage [11]. This change in phase angle is referred to as the phase-angle 
jump. The phase-angle jump manifests itself as a shift in zero-crossing of the instantaneous 
voltage. The concept of phase-angle jump associated with a voltage dip is illustrated in figure 2.2.  
 
Phase-angle jumps during three-phase faults are influenced by the difference in the reactance-to-
resistance ratio between the source and the feeder. Several other factors also influence phase-
angle jumps; type of fault, the distance between the fault and point of observation and the 
transformation of voltage dips to lower voltage levels [11]. Phase-angle jumps may affect power 
electronic converters since firing signals are derived from phase-angle information. 
 
Figure 2.2: Voltage dip with phase-angle jump [11] 
 
The points on the sine wave where the dip starts and ends are known to affect dip performance of 
certain process equipment such as contactors [2], [3], [11]. The point-on-wave of dip initiation is 
the phase angle of the fundamental wave at which the dip starts. The point-on-wave of dip 
recovery is the phase angle of the fundamental voltage at which the voltage recovers to 90% of 
nominal. The positive-going zero crossing of pre-event voltage is often used as the reference 
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2.2.3 CAUSES OF VOLTAGE DIPS 
 
Voltages dips are primarily caused by short-duration overcurrents flowing through the power 
system. The principal contributions to overcurrents are power system faults, motor starting and 
transformer energizing. 
 
Power system faults are the most frequent cause of voltage dips, particularly single-phase short-
circuits [1]. In the event of a short-circuit, for a large area of the adjacent network, the voltage in 
the faulted phase drops to a value between 0 and 1pu, depending on the impedance between the 
point of fault and the point of measurement.  
 
2.2.3.1 Motor Starting 
 
Voltage dips can be experienced on starting of large direct-on-line electrical motors. A starting 
motor appears as a large load with low power factor, which improves as the motor approaches full 
speed. A start-up motor could draw five to six times normal full load current [2]. Figure 2.3 shows 
an example of a voltage dip due to motor starting. 
 
Figure 2.3: Voltage dip due to motor starting [12] 
 
The starting of a motor load gives rise to voltage dips characterized by a small sudden drop in 
voltage, followed by a gradual recovery. Electrical motors are three-phase balanced loads and the 
associated voltage drops are the same in all phases. The voltage dip lasts until the large current 
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2.2.3.2 Transformer Energizing 
 
The energising of a large transformer gives rise to voltage dips characterized by a sudden drop in 
voltage and a slow recovery. Unlike the case of motor starting, the voltage dip magnitudes are 
different in the three phases. The inrush current is different in the three phases and is associated 
with appreciable content of second and fourth harmonic distortion [1]. An example of a voltage dip 
due to the energising of a transformer is shown in figure 2.4. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Voltage dip due to transformer energising [12] 
 
 
2.2.3.3 Power System Faults 
 
Voltage dips are caused by faults on the utility network or within the customer’s plant. A network 
fault indicates either a short-circuit condition or an abnormal open-circuit condition. The nature of 
voltage dips can be influenced by the symmetry of a network fault. Two types of voltage dips are 
depicted in figure 2.5: asymmetrical dip (a) and symmetrical dip (b). 
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Figure 2.5(a): Asymmetrical dip [12]                       Figure 2.5(b): Symmetrical dip [12] 
 
 
The drop in voltage is a function of the characteristics of fault current and the position of the fault 
in relation to the point of measurement. The duration of the dip event is a function of the 
characteristics of system protection and recovery time of the connected loads.  
 
In areas of high lightning activity, dip performance of a utility network is negatively influenced by 
lightning-induced short-circuits. Lightning-induced faults may arise as a result of the following 
phenomena: 
 Direct lightning strike to one of the phase conductors. 
 Indirect lightning strike due to electromagnetic coupling from a strike in the vicinity of the 
overhead line. When lightning terminates on a grounded structure, an electromagnetic wave is 
generated, which induces a voltage on adjacent structures. 
 Back-flashover from the shield-wire or the steel tower, where the combined impedance of the 
shield wire, tower and tower footing is sufficiently high to give rise to a voltage drop that 
exceeds the basic insulation level of the line. 
 
Faults due to insulator pollution occur when a conductive layer of liquid electrolyte is deposited on 
the insulator surface. Insulator pollution may arise due to bird pollution, marine pollution or 
industrial pollutants. The flashover mechanism on polluted insulators is briefly discussed in [13]. 
The insulator becomes coated with a layer of pollution containing soluble salts or diluted acids. In 
this state the dry pollution layer is non-conductive. In the presence of moisture (fog, mist or light 
rain), the pollution layer becomes conductive. Surface leakage currents start to flow and the 
resultant heating effect dries out parts of the pollution layer. The pollution layer never dries out 
uniformly, and in places the conducting path is interrupted by dry bands. The full phase-to-ground 
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voltage is then established across the dry bands, resulting in air breakdown and bridging of the 
dry bands by arcs. If the resistance of the wet part of the pollution layer is sufficiently low, the arcs 
across the dry bands will be sustained. The rise in temperature due to leakage currents results in 
further drying out of the pollution layer and the arcs continue to extend along the insulator surface. 
The insulator string is ultimately bridged and a line-to-ground fault is established. 
 
Overhead line structures provide nesting and perching opportunities for many bird species. Bird-
initiated electrical faults can take one of three forms, namely, bird electrocutions, bird streamers 
and insulator pollution as a result of bird droppings. Vosloo [14] conducted research studies on 
the interaction of birds with power lines. Bird electrocution may occur when birds with large wing-
spans are perched or attempt to perch on power line towers or conductors. The bird creates a 
short-circuit by physically bridging the airgap between live parts or the airgap between live and 
earthed parts. This causes lethal current to flow through the body of the bird. Large birds that 
roost on power lines emit watery exctreta, which may sufficiently reduce the airgap strength to 
cause a flashover between live conductors or between tower and live parts. Research has 
revealed that the bird streamer mechanism is responsible for the large number of unknown line 
faults on the Eskom’s transmission system [14], [15]. The bird streamer mechanism was not 
recognised as a significant problem in the electricity industry possibly due to the fact that bird 
streamer flashovers occur in remote areas and leave little evidence [14].  
 
A significant number of faults on the Eskom transmission system are fire-related faults due to the 
large number of veld fires during winter [14]. In addition to veld fires, the burning of sugar cane 
during the harvesting season in South Africa, has also contributed to the large number of fire-
related transmission line faults.  
 
The problem that utilities experience with regard to vegetation concerns principally the case of tall 
trees that may fall on power lines or short trees that grow within the servitude boundaries. The 
trees encroach on statutory clearances and thus compromise safety. In South Africa, the greatest 
threat presented by vegetation is the risk of fire [14].  
 
Failures of transmission towers are generally related to extreme weather conditions with a low 
probability of occurring (for instance, high levels of ice loading in South Africa).  
 
Line hardware failures are relatively uncommon [6]. Typical failures in this category include 
mechanical failure of jumpers, shield wires, overhead conductor and fibre-optic cables. 
Vandalism, ageing and interaction with fauna, all play a role in the failure of utility line hardware. 
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2.2.4 VOLTAGE DIP CHARACTERIZATION 
 
Voltage dip characterization is the process of extracting useful information from measurements 
that describe the dip event without the need to retain every detail of the event. The magnitude and 
duration are the main characteristics of a voltage dip.  
 
2.2.4.1     The IEC Method 
 
Voltage dips are characterized by the measurement of dip duration below the threshold and by dip 
magnitude. The IEC 61000-4-30 standard [16] defines voltage dip duration as the instant when 
the r.m.s. voltage on one phase falls below the dip threshold to the instant when all three phases 
are again above the dip threshold. The magnitude of the voltage dip is given by the maximum 
r.m.s. excursion from the declared voltage.  
 
Technical publications on voltage dips [1], [17] have identified a number of limitations of the 
characterization method specified in the IEC standard [16]. A voltage drop in a single phase is 
characterized as equally severe as a voltage drop in all three phases, whereas the latter event is 
typically much more severe for industrial equipment. Methods to characterize non-rectangular 
dips and assess their effects on equipment operation are not specified. In reality, voltage dips are 
seldom one-stage rectangular events [17].  
 
The IEC dip classification method [16] does not provide a direct link with customer equipment 
performance. An additional drawback with this method is that information is lost making it harder 
to gain insight into the fault characteristics (fault type and location).  
 
2.2.4.2     The ABC Classification Method 
 
In response to the limitations of the IEC method, Bollen et al [1], [4], [17] proposes a more intuitive 
approach to the characterization of three-phase voltage dips. The ABC classification method 
distinguishes between seven dip types (A to G) by analysing possible types of short-circuits and 
the dip propagation through transformers. Table 2.1 summarizes these dip classes as a function 
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Table 2.1: Dip classes of several faults measured at different locations [1] 






between phase and 
neutral after a Dy 







after a Dy or Yd 
transformer) 
Three-phase A A A A 
Single-phase B C D C 
Phase-to-phase C D C D 
Two-phase-to-ground E F F G 
 
 
Table 2.2 shows voltage phasors for different dip classes, in which the positive-sequence, 
negative-sequence and zero-sequence impedances are considered to be equal. The voltage in 
the faulted phase or between the faulted phases is indicated by 
*
V . The complex pre-fault voltage 
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Table 2.2: The ABC classification method [1] 

















































































































































































































The ABC classification method was introduced to describe the propagation of voltage dips 
through transformers. This method of voltage dip classification is the oldest and the most 
commonly used, possibly due to its simplicity [17]. The ABC method can also be used to extract 
information on the fault type from recorded data. The limitation of the ABC classification is the 
assumption that the sequence impedances are equal. The symmetrical component classification, 
discussed next, overcomes this limitation. 
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2.2.4.3     The Symmetrical Component Classification 
 
To determine the retained voltage at the point of common coupling (PCC), consider the circuit 
depicted in figure 2.6. The subscripts 1, 2 and 0 represent positive-sequence, negative-sequence 
and zero-sequence quantities, respectively. The letter U represents the retained voltage at the 














Figure 2.6: Voltage divider model  
 
If the fault impedance is zero, the retained voltage is zero at the fault location and non-zero but 
less than the pre-fault voltage for all other locations. For a three-phase fault at the location 
indicated by the ‘fault symbol’ in figure 2.6, the positive-sequence magnitude of the retained 
voltage at the PCC is obtained from expression (2.1) as follows: 
 
Equation (2.1) forms the basis for the characterization of voltage dips due to non-symmetrical 
faults. Consider the equivalent circuit for a phase-to-phase fault shown in figure 2.7 below. For a 
phase-to-phase fault, the zero-sequence currents and voltage are zero. The negative-sequence 
























Source impedance Zs1 Zs2 Zs0
PPC
U1 U2 
Impedance to the fault 
Zf1 Zf2 Zf0
Source
I1 = positive sequence current (A)
I2 = negative sequence current (A)
U1 = positive sequence voltage (V)
U2 = negative sequence voltage (V)
Z f1Z s1
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The voltage across the fault impedance is defined by the difference between      and      . Equation 
(2.2) and (2.3) were derived using the voltage divider rule.  
 
 
To characterize the dip event two quantities are introduced. Firstly, the characteristic voltage V is 
determined by calculating the difference between positive-sequence and negative-sequence 
voltages, given by equations (2.2) and (2.3). Secondly, the PN factor or positive-negative factor 
(represented by letter F), is determined by computing the sum of the sequence voltages. The 
characteristic voltage and the PN factor are expressed mathematically in equation (2.4) and 
equation (2.5), respectively.    
 
 
Equation (2.3) is of the same form as the expression for the retained voltage for a three-phase 
fault. The voltage dip event described above is referred to as Ca-type dip, implying that the main 
voltage drop is the phase b and phase c with characteristic voltage according to equation (2.4) 
and PN factor according to equation (2.5).  
 
The symmetrical component classification distinguishes between dip events with the main voltage 
drop in one phase and dip events with the main voltage drop in two phases. The symmetrical dip 
classification method is summarized in Table 2.3. The first column gives voltage dip types. The 
second column  gives the phases that show a severe drop in voltage, for example, a Cb-type dip 
results in severe voltage drop in phase a and phase c. The third and fourth columns show general 









U 1 Z s1 Z s2 Z f1 + + + Z f2 




Z s1 Z s2 Z f1 + + + Z f2 
E 
1 = (2.3) 
(2.4) V = U 1 U 2 = Z s1 Z s2 Z f1 + + + Z f2 
E 
1 
_ + Z f1 Z f2 
(2.5) F = U 1 + U 2 = Z s1 Z s2 Z f1 + + + Z f2 
Z s1 E 
1 E 1 
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Table 2.3: Dip types according the symmetric component method [1] 



















The advantage of the symmetrical component method is that its characteristics (for example, 
voltage drop in each phase) can be extracted from measured data. The symmetrical component 
method is a systematic approach to the analysis of unbalanced voltage dips. For this reason, it is 
preferable above the ABC classification method. 
 
2.2.4.4     The South African Dip Classification Method 
 
Voltage dip performance in South Africa was traditionally presented in the form of a two-
dimensional plot of dip magnitude and duration. In a paper presented at the First Southern African 
Power Quality Conference, Coney and Johnson [18] reviewed the development of power quality 
standards in South Africa. Voltage dips due to single-phase, two-phase and three-phase faults are 
differentiated on the dip chart by use of different symbols. Dips due to single-phase faults are 
represented by a red circle, two-phase faults (phase-to-phase or phase-to-phase-to-ground faults) 
by a blue square and dips due to three-phase faults by a green diamond, as shown in figure 2.8. 
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In attempt to improve the reporting of voltage dip performance, the dip window was developed. 
The dip window is fundamentally similar to the dip chart except that the dip area is now divided 
into smaller areas labelled A, B, C and D as depicted in figure 2.9. 
 
 
Figure 2.9: The ABCD voltage dip window [18] 
 
Voltage dips in area A are caused by faults remote from the dip measurement point, which cause 
significant voltage depression at the point of fault. These faults are rapidly cleared by the correct 
operation of protection close to the fault. 
 
Voltage dips in area B are due to low-magnitude faults (high resistance faults) cleared after a time 
delay by back-up protection or possibly faults at a lower voltage level where protection times are 
longer. Dips in area B may also result from faults on the customer premises.  
 
Voltage dips in area C are caused by severe faults on the network close to the point of 
measurement. These faults are cleared rapidly by zone 1 protection. 
 
Voltage dips in area D are caused by severe faults or faults at the source side of a radial line 
feeding the PCC or the point of observation. These faults are cleared slowly. Dip area D is 
generally thought to be representing poor or incorrect operation of the protection system [18]. 
 
The advantage of this classification is that each dip category can be related to the protection 
characteristics of the power system. However this method of dip classification is not without 
drawbacks. 
 
The major problem with this characterization method is that for dips in classes A, B and D, the 
threshold is 10%. Dips of this nature occur frequently and are largely caused by operation of the 
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In addition, the extent of the network over which dips are recorded is great and would result in 
large numbers of recorded dips. 
 
Consequently the electricity industry proposed to supplement the ABCD dip window with an 
additional area, labelled E, for contracting and regulation purposes – shown in figure 2.10. The 
30% threshold in area E, brought about two effects. Firstly, sensitivity is limited and therefore only 
localised dips are reported on. Secondly, the 30% dip magnitude represents a higher threshold, 




Figure 2.10: Supplementing the dip chart with an additional E class [18] 
 
In the process of formulating power quality standards, it became clear that the ABCD 
characterization philosophy was inadequate. In 1996, the power quality standard [8] was 
introduced for application in the South African power quality context.  
 
The classification of voltage dips, according to [8], is based on a combination of network 
protection characteristics and customer equipment sensitivity. The standard defines a voltage dip 
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Figure 2.11: Voltage dip window according to NRS 048-2:1996 [8] 
 
The vertical line at 20ms blocks off events below 1 cycle as such events are not generated in 
interconnected networks and have no effect on customers’ equipment. The horizontal line at 20% 
marks the onset of possible problems with variable speed drives. Customer motor control contacts 
drop out in the presence of dips with magnitude in the range 20% to 60% and duration of 20ms to 
150ms [8].  
 
The compatibility levels for voltage dips are given in the form of a maximum number of voltage 
dips per year for each voltage dip class [8]. As measured data became available, inherent 
shortcomings of specifying dip limits were highlighted and the standard was subsequently revised 
in 2003.  Figure 2.12 shows the dip window according to the revised standard [10]. In figure 2.12, 
U is the retained voltage at the PCC or point of measurement. ∆U is the change in voltage 
expressed as a proportion of declared voltage. Declared voltage is defined in [10] as the voltage 
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The shaded area in the dip chart of figure 2.12 represents minimum dip immunity requirement for 
customer plant. The reasoning for various dip classes is listed in Table 2.4 below. 
 

































2.2.5 EFFECTS OF VOLTAGE DIPS 
 
Electrical equipment operates best when the r.m.s. voltage is constant and equal to nominal 
voltage. For each piece of industrial equipment, it is possible to determine how long it will continue 
to operate in the presence of a voltage depression or an interruption. Voltage dips can have the 
following effects on customer equipment: 
 Tripping of computers and process-control equipment as a result of operation of undervoltage 
protection. 




Values of duration and depth Basis for definition 
Duration > 20 ms to 3 s Dip definition (20 ms to 3 s) 
Y 
Depth 30 %, 20 %, 15 % Minimum plant compatibility requirement (this covers a 
significant number of short duration dips)  
Duration > 20 ms to 150 ms Typical zone 1 clearance (no pilot wire) 
X1 
Depth 30 % to 40 % Desired plant immunity – as this spans many dips 
caused by remote faults on the licensee network 
Duration > 20 ms to 150 ms Typical zone 1 clearance (no pilot wire) 
X2 
Depth 40 % to 60 % Dips potentially causing drives to trip, caused by remote 
faults on the licensee network 
Duration > 150 ms to 600 ms Typical zone 2 and accelerated clearance  
Also some distribution faults 
S 
Depth 20 % to 60 % Plant compatibility (drives trip > 20 %) caused by remote 
faults on the licensee network 
Duration > 20 ms to 600 ms Zone 1 and zone 2 clearance times 
T 
Depth 60 % to 100 % Plant compatibility (contactors trip > 60 %) caused by close-
up faults on the licensee network 
Duration > 600 ms to 3 s Back-up and thermal protection clearance or long recovery 
times (transient voltage stability) or both 
Z1 
Depth 15 % to 30 % Remote faults 
Post-dip motor recovery without stalling 
Duration > 600 ms to 3 s Back-up and thermal protection clearance 
 
Z2 
Depth 30 % to 100 % Closer faults 
Potential motor stalling 
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 Variable speed drives can trip due to operation of undervoltage protection and overcurrent 
protection. 
 Stalling of directly-fed motors. 
 Partial or complete extinguishing of lamps. 
 
Voltage dip performance is not a standard specification on industrial equipment [2]. Consequently, 
customers are largely unaware of the potential dip sensitivity problems when purchasing such 
equipment. It follows that equipment testing is probably the most efficient way to assess 
equipment sensitivity to voltage dips. The end result of voltage dip testing of equipment is a 
voltage-time curve called voltage tolerance curve for that specific type of equipment. A voltage 
tolerance curve describes the sensitivity of equipment to changes (reduction) in supply voltage. 
 
Different categories of equipment and even different brands of equipment within a category may 
have significantly different sensitivities to voltage dips [5]. This makes it difficult to develop a 
single standard that defines the sensitivity of industrial process equipment. The effects of dips on 
common industrial equipment are discussed next. 
 
2.2.5.1 Computers and Process Control Equipment 
 
The power supply of a computer normally consists of a diode rectifier along with a voltage 




Figure 2.13: Computer power supply [2] 
 
The capacitor connected to the non-regulated d.c. bus reduces the voltage ripple at the input of 
the voltage regulator. The voltage regulator converts the non-regulated d.c. voltage of a few 
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If the input a.c. voltage drops, the voltage on the d.c. side of the rectifier drops. The voltage 
controller is able to keep its output voltage constant over a certain range of input voltage levels. If 
the voltage at the d.c. bus becomes too low, the regulated d.c. voltage will also start to drop and 
ultimately errors may occur in the digital circuits. Tripping of a computer during a voltage dip is 
attributed to the d.c. bus dropping below the minimum input voltage for which the voltage 
controller can operate correctly.  
 
2.2.5.2 Motor Contactors 
 
The purpose of the contactors is to control high magnitudes of voltages and currents with small 
control voltages and currents to facilitate local or remote control of electrical motors and other 
machinery. Contactors can easily be integrated with other process circuits to perform more 
complex functions such as coordinated protection and process automation. A contactor typically 
consists of three parts, namely, the control coil, the magnetic circuit and the spring-loaded 
mechanical link that controls the main and the auxiliary contacts.  
 
The supply voltage is used to set up the field in the magnetic circuit, which keeps the contacts in 
position via a spring action. In the event that the supply voltage fails, the contacts open preventing 
uncontrolled restarting of the motor when the supply is available again. This is acceptable for long 
interruptions where the unexpected starting of motors can be dangerous. However, contactors 
also drop for voltage dips, where such behaviour is not always desirable.  
 
Djokić, Milanović and Kirschen [11] conducted comprehensive studies to analyse the behaviour of 
contactors during voltage dips and short interruptions. The point-on-wave of dip initiation, the 
phase shift during the voltage dip and deviations of pre-dip voltage supply from ideal conditions, 
have a profound influence on the behaviour of a.c. coil contactors [11]. The voltage tolerance 
curves have distinct shapes for 0˚ and 90˚ points-on-wave of dip initiation. The voltage tolerance 
curves for other points-on-wave lie between these two extreme cases. Typical voltage tolerance 
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Figure 2.14: Typical voltage tolerance curves for an a.c. contactor [11] 
 
A consistent remarkable phenomenon is that, for small points-on-wave at dip initiation (0˚ to 30˚), 
the voltage tolerance curve becomes better for more severe dips [2], [11]. Bollen [2] explains this 
phenomenon by stating that it is not the voltage but the current through the magnetic coil that 
creates the magnetic force to keep the contactor engaged. During a voltage dip, the contactor 
circuit, being mainly inductive, maintains currently flow for a brief period. 
 
2.2.5.3 Variable Speed a.c. Drives 
 
Adjustable speed drives are fed through a three-phase diode rectifier or through a three-phase 










Figure 2.15: An example of variable speed drive configuration [2] 
 
The d.c. voltage is inverted to an a.c. voltage of variable frequency and magnitude. Tripping of 
variable speed drives can occur due several phenomena: 
 The drive control circuitry detects abnormal operating conditions and trips the drive to 
prevent malfunctioning of power electronic components. 
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 The increased a.c. currents during the voltage dip causes an overcurrent trip or blowing of 
fuses protecting power electronic devices. 
 
2.2.5.4         Variable Speed d.c. Drives 
 
Variable speed d.c. drives typically consist of a three-phase controlled rectifier powering the 
armature winding and a single-phase controlled or non-controlled rectifier for the field winding. 
The most sensitive part of the d.c. drive is the three-phase rectifier [2]. A typical configuration of a 











Figure 2.16: d.c. Drive with separately excited armature and field windings [2] 
 
A voltage drop on the a.c. supply leads to a direct drop in armature voltage, which, in turn, leads 
to a decay in armature current. In the event of an unbalanced dip on the a.c. supply, the drops on 
the armature voltage and the field voltage are not the same [2]. This situation is undesirable 
because d.c. drives are often used for processes in which very precise speed and positioning are 
required. 
 
For d.c. drives, commutation failure is a major problem during asymmetrical dips or symmetrical 
dips with a significant phase-angle jump at the instant of dip commencement [2]. Commutation 
failure may result in d.c. current flowing through the thyristor stack and the a.c. mains. 
 
2.2.5.5 Directly-fed Induction Motors 
 
Induction motors are largely insensitive to voltage depressions [1], [2]. However, the following 
phenomena may lead to process interruption in the presence of voltage dips: 
 Voltage dips lead to severe torque oscillations at dip commencement and at voltage recovery. 
The torque oscillations are more severe when the dip is associated with a phase-angle jump. 
 When the voltage recovers, the motor draws a high inrush current to build up the airgap field 
and to re-accelerate. This inrush current can cause a post-fault dip that can lead to operation 
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 For asymmetrical dips, the motor is subjected to both positive-sequence and negative-
sequence voltages at the terminals. The negative-sequence voltages cause a torque ripple 
and large negative-sequence current. 
 
2.2.5.6 Directly-fed Synchronous Motors 
 
The effects of voltage dips on synchronous motors are similar to those on induction machines, 
that is, overcurrents and torque oscillations [2]. In the case of large voltage disturbances (dips of 
large magnitude), the additional problem with synchronous motors is that they may lose 
synchronism with the a.c. supply voltage. When a synchronous motor loses synchronism, it has to 
be stopped and the load has to be removed before it can be brought back to nominal speed 
again. 
 
2.2.5.7           Lighting 
 
In the presence of a voltage dip, certain types of lamps may extinguish completely and take 
several minutes to recover [1]. In industrial settings, where a large number of people are 
gathered, this can lead to dangerous situations. 
 
2.2.6         SOLUTIONS TO VOLTAGE DIP PROBLEMS 
 
Intermittent short-circuit faults are the underlying events that cause tripping of customer 
equipment. At the fault position the voltage drops to zero or to a value close to zero.  
 
Figure 2.17 shows the magnitude and duration of voltage dips resulting from various power 
system phenomena. The origin of voltage dips is the basis on which various mitigation strategies 
can be investigated: 
 Voltage dips due to short-circuits in the transmission network are characterized by short 
durations. At transmission voltage levels (220kV to 765kV in South Africa), system 
improvements to limit the severity of voltage dips are often found not to be feasible. Feasible 
options to improve dip performance could include installation of mitigation equipment or 
improving equipment immunity. 
 The duration of dips due to distribution system faults is a function of the type of protection 
used and recovery characteristics of the connected load. For severe long-duration dips, 
equipment improvement becomes more difficult and system improvement easier. Reduction of 
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 Voltage dips in remote distribution systems and dips due to motor starting are not expected to 
lead to equipment trips for shallow dips. Solutions for dips in this category could include both 
equipment improvement and system improvement. 
 For long-duration events, equipment improvement is no longer feasible. System improvements 
























Figure 2.17: Origin of voltage dips [2]  
 
A distinction can be made between various methods of voltage dip mitigation. Dip mitigation 
options invariably include one or more of the solutions summarized in figure 2.18. Each of these 






















EQUIPMENT IMPROVEMENT AS POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION










   






















Figure 2.18: Various methods of dip mitigation [2] 
 
2.2.6.1  Power System Grid 
 
Dip mitigation methods in this category include reducing the frequency of short-circuits and re-
configuration of the power system. 
 
(a)  System Design 
 
Reconfiguration of the power supply may result in voltage dips being less severe. Some examples 
of voltage dip mitigation methods are: 
 Splitting of busbars or substations in the supply path to limit the number of feeders in the dip 
influence zone. 
 Installing current-limiting reactors at strategic points in the system to increase the electrical 
distance to the fault. Current-limiting reactors have the effect of limiting fault level and 
therefore may make the dips more severe for other customers. 
 Supplying the busbar with sensitive equipment from two or more substations. A voltage dip in 
one substation will be mitigated by the infeed from the other substations. 
 Installing a generator near the sensitive load. The generators will maintain the voltage during a 
voltage dip due to a remote fault.  
 Improving fault-clearing time reduces the severity of the dip. Fast fault-clearing does not 
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long-duration dips on radial systems, a recloser on the main line can be used in conjunction 
with expulsion fuses on the lateral feeders.  
 
(b)  Short-circuit Reduction 
 
Voltage dip performance can be greatly enhanced by reducing the number of short-circuit faults. A 
short-circuit not only leads to a voltage dip or interruption at the customer interface but may also 
cause damage to utility equipment. The following are examples of fault mitigation strategies: 
 Implement a strict policy of vegetation management. During heavy loading of the line, the 
heating of the conductors increases their sag, making contact with trees more likely. 
 Apply industry-standard maintenance practices such as reliability-centred maintenance. 
Maintenance generally reduces the risk of faults through proactive identification of line 
hardware that is prone to failure. 
 Improve lightning performance of overhead lines that have been proven to trip during lightning 
activity. In general, this encompasses installation of line arresters, improvement of tower 
footing resistance and increasing the basic insulation level of the towers.  
 Install bird-guards or other devices to discourage bird activity on parts of the towers where a 
bird perching on the line is likely to cause a flashover. 
 Replace insulators with hydrophobic insulators in areas where pollution is known to be a 
problem. 
 Develop programs to manage fire. This may include veld fires and cane fires.  
 
2.2.6.2  The System–equipment Interface 
 
The interface between the power system and the equipment is the most important place to 
mitigate voltage dips [1]. To compensate for loss of active power supplied by the system, most of 
the mitigation techniques are based on the injection of power. 
 
(a)  Alternate Supply Source 
 
Load transfer from the faulty supply to a healthy one is an important consideration in mitigating 
long-duration dips and interruptions. The transfer operation needs to take place very fast in order 
to effectively limit the duration of the voltage dip at the load terminals. Load transfer can take 
place by use of a mechanical switch or a static switch.  
 
A static transfer switch (STS) consists of two sets of static switches. Each set is, in turn, made up 
of two anti-parallel thyristors per phase as depicted in figure 2.19.  When the disturbance is 
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detected on the primary source, the firing of switching unit 1 is disabled and the firing of switching 
unit 2 enabled. The resultant effect is that the load current commutates to the alternate supply 

















Figure 2.19: Commonly used transfer switch topology [2] 
 
This solution is inexpensive for installations where the secondary source of supply is already 
available. Therefore the application of static transfer switches is particularly attractive for 
installations which still use a mechanical transfer system. The STS is not effective in mitigating 
against voltage dips originating from the transmission system since these would also affect the 
alternate supply source. 
 
(b)  Series Compensation 
 
A static series compensator is a voltage source converter (VSC) connected in series to the 
distribution feeder. The output voltage of the series compensator adds to the supply voltage to 
obtain the desired voltage. One of the most widely used series compensation devices is the 
dynamic voltage restorer [1]. A typical configuration for a dynamic voltage restorer (DVR) is 
depicted in figure 2.20. 
 
The DVR monitors each phase of the incoming voltage. A converter transformer is used to 
connect the output of the voltage source converter to the system. In case of a dip, the device 
determines the change in voltage supply and calculates the required voltage correction to restore 
the input voltage to its rated level and waveshape. The required level of voltage correction is 

















N/C = normally closed
N/O = normally open
 
  
   















Figure 2.20: Dynamic voltage restorer [2] 
 
This device is typically designed for a certain maximum dip duration and a certain maximum dip 
magnitude. The use of DVRs is very attractive for large sensitive industrial loads, since protection 
for the entire facility can be achieved through installation of a single device. However this solution 
is costly and cannot protect the load against interruptions. 
 
(c)  Shunt Compensation 
 
A static shunt compensator (static compensator or StatCom) has the same basic configuration as 
the series compensator, but it is connected in a shunt configuration. In case of a voltage dip, the 
shunt compensator injects voltage at the secondary terminals of the transformer. If this voltage is 
greater than the system voltage required, current is then injected. Therefore the voltage at the 
load terminals is a superposition of supply voltage and the additional voltage resulting from the 






















   




















Figure 2.21: Shunt voltage compensator [2] 
 
The principal limitation of a static shunt compensator is that the source impedance is greatly 
reduced for faults at the same voltage level close to the load. In this instance, the shunt 
compensator requires large currents to mitigate such voltage dips. The shunt compensator is, 
however, effective in mitigating voltage dips due to faults upstream of the supply transformer. 
 
(d)  Motor-Generator Sets 
 
The basic principle of operation of a motor-generator set is illustrated in figure 2.22. A motor and a 
generator are connected to a common shaft together with a flywheel. In the event of a voltage dip, 










Figure 2.22: Principle of motor-generator set [2] 
 
 In some installations, the noise and maintenance requirements of a motor-generator set may be 
of concern. Under normal operating conditions, the losses in the configuration of figure 2.22 may 
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(e)  Ferroresonant Transformers 
 
A ferroresonant transformer (also known as CVT – constant voltage transformer) is designed to 
maintain a constant output voltage over a wide range of input voltages [6]. The third winding of a 
three-winding transformer is connected to a capacitor, thus forming a resonant circuit. The energy 
stored in the capacitor provides ride-through capability during voltage dips. Overrating the CVT 
provides a significant improvement in the output voltage characteristics for a given input voltage 
range [6]. 
 
An important disadvantage of the ferroresonant transformer is that its output voltage is dependent 
on load changes. Industrial loads with high inrush currents also present a problem to CVTs due to 
the tuned circuit.  
 
(f)  Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) 
 
The uninterruptible power supply (UPS) is one of the most common devices used to mitigate 
voltage dips and short interruptions [2]. A UPS consists of a converter connected to an inverter. 
The energy storage device is usually a battery bank connected to the d.c. bus. The basic 
configuration of a typical UPS is shown in figure 2.23.  
 
During normal operating conditions, input power from the a.c. grid is rectified and then inverted. 
The battery bank remains in standby mode and only serves to keep the d.c. voltage constant. The 
load is supplied via the inverter which generates a sinusoidal voltage using a PWM (pulse-width 
modulation) switching technique. In case the inverter fails, a static transfer switch connects the 
load directly to the a.c. grid.  
 
During a voltage dip, the energy released by the battery bank maintains the voltage at the d.c. 
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The main advantage of a UPS is the ease of operation and low cost. A UPS is thus an attractive 
solution for low-power equipment such as computers. For high-power loads, the costs associated 
with conversion losses and battery maintenance need careful consideration. 
 
(g)  Energy Storage Devices 
 
Series and shunt compensators need energy storage to mitigate voltage dips. In addition to 
batteries and flywheels discussed above, a superconducting magnetic energy storage (SMES) 
device is often mentioned as another form of energy storage [2], [19].  
 
The basic concept of the SMES is to take advantage of the high efficiency of a superconducting 
coil to store electrical energy in the magnetic field under normal system conditions. In the event of 
a voltage dip, the stored energy is converted back to electrical form and fed back into the system.  
 
2.2.6.3       Process Modifications 
 
Process modifications tend to be the cheapest solution to reduce equipment trips due to voltage 
dips [1], [3]. A customer often finds out about equipment immunity after the equipment has been 
installed. The discussion that follows focuses on possible options to improve dip immunity of 
process equipment. 
 
(a)  Variable Speed a.c. Drives 
 
Variable speed drives (VSDs) that are equipped with an automatic restart, perform a controlled 
stop sequence during a voltage dip. After voltage recovery, the drive starts automatically after a 
pre-defined period. Automatic restart can be considered as a feasible option for loads that are not 
speed-critical such as fans and air-conditioning. A VSD equipped with automatic ‘restart on the 
fly’, detects when the voltage recovers after a voltage dip and is re-accelerated without first halting 
the process. This option requires re-synchronisation of the drive output voltage with the voltage 
across the motor terminals due to residual flux in the motor. 
 
Improving the rectifier or the inverter can also be considered as a possible solution to mitigate 
voltage dips. Diode rectifiers are commonly used in speed drives due to their low cost [2]. 
However, it is not possible to control the d.c. bus voltage with a diode rectifier. By using a rectifier 
based on self-commutating devices (for example, IGBTs – insulated gate bipolar transistors), 
complete control of the d.c. bus is possible. 
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One of the commonly used techniques to maintain a constant d.c. voltage at the converter output 
is to use a boost converter in parallel with the rectifier. Figure 2.24 shows a circuit where a boost 
converter is employed. In the event of a voltage dip, the boost converter increases its output 


















Figure 2.24: Parallel boost converter [2] 
 
(b)  Variable Speed d.c. Drives 
 
The control circuitry of a d.c. drive essentially controls the firing angle of a controlled rectifier. A 
limited improvement in process performance can be achieved by improving the controller. The 
immediate effect of a voltage dip is a drop in motor speed. The speed controller detects this 
condition and decreases the firing angle to compensate. Variable speed d.c. drives can be 
equipped with automatic ‘restart on the fly’.  
 
Uninterruptible power supplies can be employed to increase the ride-through capability of the d.c. 
drives. A UPS requires synchronisation with the a.c. supply since the timing signals for controlled 
rectifiers are derived from the a.c. supply. 
 
(c)  Contactors 
 
For installations where a d.c. supply is available, replacement of a.c. contactors with d.c. 
contactors can be considered. The a.c. contactor coils tend to be inherently more sensitive to 
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size of the d.c. bus capacitors. Another important consideration is the battery back-up for d.c. 
contactors. 
 
2.2.7       DIP SIMULATION TECHNIQUES 
 
Two methods are generally used for the simulation of voltage dips, namely, the method of fault 
positions and the method of critical distances. Before discussing the two simulation techniques, a 
brief discussion on factors that determine dip severity is necessary. 
 
2.2.7.1     Factors Affecting Severity of Voltage Dips 
 
Voltage dips are influenced by several factors. Each of these influential factors is briefly 
discussed. 
 
(a)  Fault Type 
 
A power system fault generally refers to one of two conditions: insulation failure resulting in a 
short-circuit condition or failure of conducting path resulting in an open-circuit condition. The 
former is by far the most common failure condition. 
 
Short-circuited phases are caused by insulation failure between phase conductors or between 
phase conductor and earth electrode or both. The full range of possible short-circuit conditions is 
listed in figure 2.25 with illustrations. The three-phase fault is the only balanced or symmetrical 
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Figure 2.25: Short-circuit conditions 
 
Open-circuit conditions arise when one or more phases fail to conduct. The common causes of 
this type of failure are broken jumpers on overhead lines and joint failures on cables. Various 


















Figure 2.26: Open-circuit conditions 
(a) Three-phase fault (clear off earth) (b) Three-phase-to-earth fault 
(c) Phase-to-phase fault (d) Phase-to-phase-to-earth fault 
(e) Single-phase fault (f) Single-phase + Phase-to-phase 
(a) Single-phase open-circuit (b)  Single-phase open-circuit + 
single-phase short-circuit
(c) Two-phase open-circuit (d) Three-phase open-circuit
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The effects of a given fault type on customer equipment may be modified considerably by the 
simultaneous presence of one or more other fault conditions (for example, in a combination of a 
short-circuit condition and an open-circuit phase condition). Another factor to take into 
consideration is the fault impedance. The most severe voltage dips result from faults with zero 
fault impedance. 
 
(b)  Source Conditions 
 
Source conditions relate to the amount of all connected generation including on-site generation 
and interconnections with other systems. Supplying a sensitive load from two or more sources 
reduces the severity of the voltage dip. In the event of a fault in one source, the resultant voltage 
dip is mitigated to a certain extent by the infeed from the other sources.  
 
(c)  System Configuration 
 
Power system configuration is determined by the items of plant (for example, transformers, 
cables, overhead lines) being in service at the instant of fault. In meshed networks, the state of 
normally-open points determines the impedance between the point of observation and the point of 
fault, which in turn, affects the magnitude of a fault-induced voltage dip. The system configuration 
may change during the course of a fault, with consequent changes in the profile of the resultant 
voltage dip (for instance, sequential tripping of circuit breakers at the two ends of a faulted 
transmission line). 
 
(d)  Fault Position 
 
Faults originating from transmission systems cause dips that can be measured tens of kilometres 
away, while faults on radial distribution systems may have a more localised effect. Faults that 
occur close to the substation busbar cause the most severe dips at equipment terminals, typically 
Z2-class and T-class dips according to the dip window presented in [10].  
 
(e)  Earthing 
 
The general purpose of the earthing system is to provide protection for plant, equipment and 
personnel against fault conditions. In electrical supply systems, it is therefore common practice to 
connect the system to ground at suitable points. The tower earthing methods of overhead power 
lines have a profound influence on dip performance of the system. In addition, faults which involve 
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(f)  Weather Patterns 
 
The occurrence of faults and consequent voltage dips is generally higher during severe weather 
conditions. Severe weather can take many forms such as wind, snow, rain or ice. Factors such as 
soil resistivity, vegetation growth and presence of wildlife are largely dependent on rainfall 
patterns. These factors have been proven to affect fault performance of overhead lines [14]. 
 
(g)  System Protection 
 
The type of protection system used may have a significant impact on the duration and profile of 
the voltage dip. Unit protection schemes on transmission systems can clear the fault typically 
within 80ms to 150ms [6]. In applications where impedance protection schemes are employed, 
zone 2 clearance time is delayed by several hundreds of milliseconds. 
 
On MV and LV systems, definite time lag (DTL) overcurrent schemes and inverse definite 
minimum time (IDMT) overcurrent protection schemes are extensively used. In DTL protection 
schemes, currents above a threshold value are detected in one or more phases and interrupted 
after a preset time. The trip time is the same irrespective of the magnitude of fault current. IDMT 
protection schemes respond faster to more severe fault currents. Both DTL and IDMT protection 
schemes may take several seconds to clear a fault. 
 
(h)  Loading 
 
Induction and synchronous motors have the largest current demand during and after a short-
circuit condition [2]. After a voltage dip, electrical motors re-accelerate until pre-event speed is 
reached. During re-acceleration, the motor takes a larger current with low power factor, which 
delays voltage recovery. 
 
2.2.7.2 The Method of Fault Positions 
 
The method of fault positions is used to calculate the characteristics of voltage dips (magnitude 
and duration) at the monitored site for a number of faults spread throughout the supply system. 
The method of fault positions proceeds as follows: 
 Determine the area of the power system in which short-circuit faults will be considered.  
 Select the busbar of interest (examined site). Select a position for a short-circuit fault (busbar 
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 Calculate dip parameters at the monitored site (magnitude and duration) for the selected fault 
characteristics. The fault positions are selected, first, close to the monitored site and then 
further away until the entire area of the power system is covered. 
 The process is then repeated for different combinations of fault positions and short-circuit fault 
characteristics to cover all cases.  
 
2.2.7.3  The Method of Critical Distances 
 
The method of critical distances does not calculate the voltage dip characteristics for a given fault 
position, but the fault position (distance from the monitored site) for a given voltage dip magnitude 
and duration at the monitored site. The method of critical distances works as follows: 
 Determine the area of the power system in which short-circuit faults will be considered.  
 Select a range of dip magnitudes (for example, 0.2pu to 0.8pu in steps of 0.2pu) and a range 
of dip durations (for example, 200ms to 3s in steps of 200ms).  
 Select short-circuit fault characteristics for each set of selected dip parameters at the 
monitored site (for instance, magnitude of less than 0.2pu and duration of less than 200ms). 
Fault characteristics may include the following: 
o Type of fault (single-phase, three-phase etc). 
o Fault impedance at the fault position. 
o Method of short-circuit fault calculation. 
 The next step is to select the monitored site and line segments in the power system where 
short-circuit fault positions are to be calculated, for the given parameters. 
 Repeat the calculations for different combinations of dip parameters (at the monitored site) 
and short-circuit characteristics.  
 
2.2.7.4 Dip Influence Zones  
 
The voltage dip influence zone encloses the busbars and line segments where faults cause a 
voltage dip more severe than a given value at the monitored node.  
 
Voltage dip performance is assessed by performing short-circuit analysis in order to determine dip 
magnitudes at a particular busbar as a function of short-circuit locations throughout the system. 
Figure 2.27 is an illustration of the dip influence zone for an industrial customer. An appropriate 
regulatory approach must be such that the utility limits the number of faults closer to the customer 




   
- 44 - 
 
 
Figure 2.27: Voltage dip influence zones [7] 
 
 
2.3     POWER QUALITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
Power quality management refers to a set of activities aimed at optimising the level to which the 
electrical product conforms to the requirements of the customer’s facility. The acceptable level of 
power quality requires a balance between power system investment and safe operating margins 
of customer plant.  
 
Since 1996, the power quality performance of South African utilities has been regulated through 
application of locally developed standards [8], [10], [20]. The minimum requirements specified in 
[8] are intended to be applied as quality measures of the electrical product at the point of supply to 
end customers of the electricity utility. The standard [8] provides NERSA with a means of 
evaluating and regulating the quality of supply provided by the utilities.  
 
2.3.1   NRS 048-2 DIP REQUIREMENTS: THE INITIAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.3.1.1 Assessment Method 
 
NERSA requires utilities to install suitable measuring equipment at sufficient locations in their 
networks in order to characterize and report on voltage dip performance [20]. The measurement 
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NRS 048-2 standard [8] requires that all three phases be monitored. In the case of solidly earthed 
systems, the phase-to-neutral voltages are to be monitored. In the case of delta-connected 
systems or systems with impedance earthing, phase-to-phase voltages are to be monitored. 
Assessed dip values are characterized according to the dip chart shown in figure 2.12 in section 
2.2.4.4.  
 
2.3.1.2 Compatibility Levels 
 
The compatibility levels for voltage dips are given in the form of a maximum number of voltage 
dips per year for each voltage dip type [8]. The voltage dip limits are given for defined network 
voltage ranges. Table 1.1 shows voltage dip limits to be considered as minimum compatibility 
standard. Table 1.1 is reproduced here as Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5: Voltage dip limits per year for each voltage dip type [8] 
Network Voltage Range Number of Voltage Dips per Year for each Dip Category 
 S T X Y Z 
6.6kV to ≤ 44kV 30 30 100 150 20 
6.6kV to ≤ 44kV Rural 69 54 215 314 49 
> 44kV to ≤ 132kV 25 25 80 120 16 
220kV to ≤ 765kV 11 6 45 88 5 
 
A large proportion of voltage dips less than 20ms in duration are generated in customers’ plant. It 
is therefore not a regulatory requirement to report on Y-class dips.  
 
The assessment method for voltage dips allows for the extreme 5% of measured values to be 
discounted when calculating the assessed level. These assessed values are to be compared with 
voltage dip limits listed in Table 2.5. In the vent that a customer launches a complaint that annual 
dip limits have been exceeded, the utility is required to demonstrate compliance with the 95% 
assessment criteria for its area of supply. 
 
2.3.2     SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE WITH DIP MONITORING 
 
2.3.2.1 The Initial Power Quality Framework 
 
Actual measured utility dip performance has consistently resulted in higher dip numbers than the 
limits imposed by the initial power quality framework [7]. The availability of monitoring instruments 
was poor, typically failing during lightning seasons when many of the dips would have occurred 
[7]. Figure 2.28 shows an example of the actual 95% statistic for X-class dip events in relation to 
the overall system compatibility level of 80 dip events specified in [8]. Also shown in the figure is 
the number of instruments and the average dip statistic. 
 
  
   




Figure 2.28: X-class dip performance vs. dip limits [7] 
 
2.3.2.2 Utility Perspective 
 
The inability to meet limits combined with the impact of seasonal changes, led utilities to the 
conclusion that the limits specified in NRS 048-2 [8] are unachievable without significant 
investment in the network. On the other hand, research shows that many of the less severe X-
class dips (typically less than 30% in magnitude) do not affect customers, making such 
investments questionable [7]. 
 
2.3.2.3 Customer Perspective 
 
Dissatisfaction exists as a result of the significant difference between actual performance at some 
sites in the country and the limits in [7]. There are two reasons for the dissatisfaction. Firstly, 
some sites exceed the dip limits, as illustrated on the right hand side of figure 2.29. Secondly, 
possibility exists that the utility may allow acceptable dip performance to deteriorate to a level 
closer to the dip limits prior to initiating corrective action, as illustrated on the left hand side of 
figure 2.29. At the time of implementing the standard, the dip limits were considered to be less 
restrictive by the customers. An expectation was present at the time that a revision of voltage dip 
performance would result in stricter (more restrictive) dip limits. Recent improved statistical data 
reveals that the compatibility levels need to allow for even more dip events per annum [7]. A 
survey of power quality costs also revealed that a large percentage of customers are not willing to 





   


















Figure 2.29: Illustration of potential problem with dip limits [7] 
 
2.3.3 THE NEW POWER QUALITY FRAMEWORK 
 
The revised edition (2003) of the NRS 048-2 standard [10] specifies QOS parameters more 
comprehensively than was the case in the first edition (1996). Each of the voltage quality 
parameters is described, and where appropriate, compatibility levels, limits and assessment 
methods are specified.  
  
2.3.3.1 Assessment Method 
 
The assessment method is the same as in the first edition of the standard, described in section 
2.3.1.1. The revised power quality standard [10] requires that all three phases be monitored. For 
solidly earthed systems, the phase-to-neutral voltages are to be monitored. In the case of delta-
connected systems or systems with impedance earthing, phase-to-phase voltages are to be 
monitored. The assessed dip values are characterized according to the revised dip chart shown in 
figure 2.12 in section 2.2.4.4.  
 
2.3.3.2 Compatibility Levels 
 
No compliance criteria are specified for voltage dips. The revised power quality standard [10] 
requires utilities to develop quality management systems for the management of voltage dip 
performance. This research work develops such an approach. 
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2.3.4  LIMITATIONS OF THE INITIAL POWER QUALITY STANDARD  
 
The original NRS 048-2 dip characterization method [8] was based primarily on theoretical 
considerations. The standard was adopted with an understanding that it will be revised after five 
years. Dip measurements on Eskom’s networks over a five-year period have highlighted important 
limitations of the previous standard: 
 The voltage dip performance requirements specified in [8] were based on limited statistical 
information (less than 2 years) obtained from about hundred Eskom power quality instruments.  
 The availability of the monitoring instruments was poor, typically failing during the lightning 
seasons, when most of the dips would have occurred [7]. 
 The definition of voltage dip limits has a potentially negative effect on some of the customers, 
as the utility may allow acceptable levels of performance to deteriorate for the sites that 
achieve better than acceptable performance.  
 The effects of voltage dip events on customers are dependent on network fault performance 
and on the sensitivity of process equipment. The definition of a global set of compatibility 
levels is therefore not practical. 
 Voltage dips of less than 30% to 40% in magnitude, and duration shorter than 150ms, have a 
high probability of occurring in South African high voltage networks. These dip events do not 
have a significant effect on customers’ plant.  
 The previous edition of NRS 048-2 [8] was developed primarily by utilities, although the 
process included customer forums hosted by NERSA. 
 
In order to manage voltage dips in line with dip limits, Eskom holds regular customer interaction 
forums to discuss power quality issues. In these interactions, an appreciable amount of time is 
dedicated to discussions on voltage dips, that is, root causes and action plans to eliminate or at 
least reduce the probability of re-occurrence. 
 
The Eskom Senior Power Quality Engineer is the key stakeholder in such forums. The following 
information, pertinent to voltage dips, is presented to the customer: 
 Date of occurrence, dip class, maximum duration, dip depth and phases involved. 
 Root cause and circuits on the dips occurred. 
 Historical monthly dips for each customer supply point. 
 Statistical dip trends (12 months moving averages) for each customer supply point. 
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Figure 2.30 shows an example of a dip performance graph for a pulp and paper customer. The 
graph shows the number of dips (per class) plotted against the month in which the dip events 
occurred. 
 
Figure 2.30: Example of dip performance graph for a monitored site [21] 
 
The limitations of the current practice in communicating dip performance are highlighted below: 
 The utility’s key objective is to avoid exceeding dip limits for each voltage dip class. 
 The impact of dips originating from the customer’s plant is not assessed. Therefore corrective 
actions are often initiated on the utility side only. 
 There is limited effort on the customer side to quantify financial losses due to voltage dips. 
Availability of production losses due to dips would assist the utility in making investment 
decisions to improve dip performance. 
 The worst-performing circuits are not presented. This makes it difficult for the customer to 
assess critical circuits affecting the industrial plant. 
 For a given fault on a specific part of the network, the dip impact at the point of supply is not 
quantified.  
 
2.3.5 THE NEW APPROACH 
 
The new regulatory framework was developed in response to the difficulty of managing voltage 
dip performance based on limits specified in the first edition of the power quality standard [8]. The 
development of NERSA’s power quality directive [9] was based on substantial consultations with 
utilities, customers, equipment suppliers, standards bodies, academics and consultants. The 
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framework defined in the directive recognises the need for each of the parties in the design and 
operation of industrial and power system equipment. 
 
The new regulatory framework recognises the dependence of voltage dip performance on 
geographical location, network topology and environmental influences. This research work 
develops an alternative approach on power quality interactions between customers and the utility, 
with specific reference to voltage dips. The research was initiated as a case study to investigate 
the feasibility of implementing a dip performance management system as opposed to the 
imposition of annual dip limits. The research study proposes the following: 
 Comprehensive analysis of dip data considering root causes, circuits where dips originate, dip 
costs and dip classes. It is expected that this exercise will show how environmental factors 
(for example, single-phase faults due to industrial pollutants, theft of conductor etc) influence 
dip performance at the selected site. The purpose of the analysis is to enable the customer 
and the utility to make informed decisions on initiatives to limit the impact of voltage dips. 
 Network simulations to calculate dip influence zones. The voltage dip influence zones enable 
the customer and the utility to quantify the severity of dips at the monitored site as a result of 
faults on different locations in the supply network. The simulations take into account network 
topology, conductor sizes, network configuration and tower top geometry.   
 
Table 2.6 highlights key differences between the existing practice in communicating dip 
performance and the dip communication strategy proposed in this study. Table 2.6 was generated 
by the author by analysing key differences between the existing dip performance communication 
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Table 2.6: Differences between dip performance communication practices  
 Existing dip performance 
communication strategy 




1. Monitor dip events to ensure dip limits 
are not exceeded. 
1. Collaborate with customers to ensure 
mutual responsibility for dip performance. 
2. Provide detailed information to enable 
decisions on QOS improvement projects. 
Points of 
discussion 
1. Dip data (class, time of occurrence, 
phases involved, duration, magnitude). 
2. Cause of dips. 
3. Average number of dip events per 
customer meterpoint (12 months 
moving average). 
4. Progress on QOS improvement 
initiatives identified during previous 
interactions. 
1. Comprehensive analysis of recorded dip 
events: 
i. Ownership of network where dips 
occurred. 
ii. Causes of dips. 
iii. Circuits that affect dip performance of 
the customer’s plant most severely. 
iv. Types of dips per contributing circuit 
v. Financial impact of voltage dips on the 
customer. 
2. Dip modelling 
i. Identifying network area in which faults 
may severely affect dip performance at 
the examined site. 
ii. Simulation of electrical faults and 
resultant dips at the monitored site. 
iii. Calculating dip sensitivity zones for all 
fault types. 
3. Progress on QOS initiatives identified 
during previous interactions. 
Basis of 
interaction 
1. Dip limits per dip class per voltage 
category 
1. Joint effort to manage dip performance 
according to known factors (industrial 
pollution, conductor theft, age of plant). 
Customer 
participation 
1. Receiving feedback on progress of the 
utility’s actions to improve dip 
performance.  
1. Demonstrating how dip immunity levels 
of plant will be increased for faults on 
remote networks. 
2. Tracking production downtime losses as 
a direct result of dips. 
3. Sharing feedback on customer’s own 
initiative to improve dip performance. 
4. Receiving feedback on progress of the 
utility’s actions to improve dip 
performance.  
Difficulties 
1. Managing through dip limits and 
motivating for QOS improvement 
projects. 
1. Accuracy of dip-related downtime costs. 
 
  
   




The objective of this chapter was to review theoretical concepts relating to voltage dips. Dip 
duration and magnitude are the two most important parameters of a voltage dip.   
  
Voltage dips are caused by short-duration overcurrents flowing through the power system. The 
principal contributions to overcurrents are motor starting, transformer energizing and power 
system faults. Electrical motors are three-phase balanced loads, and the associated voltage 
drops, during start-up, are the same in all phases. The energizing of a large transformer gives rise 
to voltage dips characterized by a sudden drop in voltage and a slow recovery. Power system 
faults are the most frequent cause of voltage dips, particularly single-phase short-circuits.  
 
The causes of power system faults can be grouped into various categories. Lightning-induced 
faults may arise as a result of direct lightning strikes to one of the phase conductors. Bird-initiated 
faults arise due to bird electrocutions, bird streamers and insulator pollution as a result of bird 
droppings. Other categories of causes of faults include hardware failures, veld fires, insulator 
pollution, vegetation-induced faults and extreme weather conditions (ice loading).  
 
Various dip characterization methods have been developed in literature. According to the IEC 
method, the dip magnitude is given by the maximum r.m.s. excursion from the declared voltage. 
The dip duration is defined as the instant when the r.m.s. voltage on one phase falls below the dip 
threshold to the instant when all three phases are again above the dip threshold. The limitation of 
the IEC method is that a voltage drop in a single phase is characterized as equally severe as a 
voltage drop in all three phases. 
 
The ABC method distinguishes between seven types of dip events by analysing possible types of 
short-circuits, the dip propagation through transformers and connection of measuring instruments. 
The limitation of the ABC method is the assumption that the sequence impedances are equal. The 
symmetrical dip characterization method distinguishes between dip events with the main voltage 
drop in one phase and dip events with the main voltage drop in two phases. To characterize the 
dip event, the symmetrical method introduces two parameters: the positive-negative factor and 
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The South African dip characterization method has evolved over many years from the ABCD dip 
window to the STXYZ dip window currently in use. The dip window is a two-dimensional plot of dip 
magnitude and dip duration as a function of customer equipment dip immunity levels and speed of 
protection systems. 
 
Different categories of equipment may have significantly different sensitivities to voltage dips. 
Voltage dips cause tripping of computers and process-control equipment as a result of operation 
of undervoltage protection. In the presence of a dip, motor contactors can drop out, variable 
speed drives can trip and directly-fed induction motors can stall. 
 
Solutions to voltage dip problems can be categorized into three: power system grid, system-
equipment interface and process improvement solutions. Power system grid solutions include 
system configuration (splitting of busbars, on-site generation, improving fault-clearing time) and 
reducing the frequency of short-circuits (servitude maintenance, installing bird guards).   
 
Most of the dip mitigation techniques used at the system-equipment interface are based on the 
injection of power to compensate for the loss of active power during a dip event. Motor-generator 
sets, uninterruptible power supplies and ferroresonant transformers are some of many devices 
that can be installed at the point of common coupling (PCC).  
 
Process improvement solutions are aimed at improving the response of industrial equipment to 
voltage dips and dip immunity levels of equipment. Variable speed drives can be equipped with 
automatic restart. For installations where a d.c. supply is available, replacement of a.c. contactors 
with d.c. contactors can be considered. 
 
Two methods are generally used for modelling of voltage dips, namely, the method of fault 
positions and the method of critical distances. The method of fault positions is used to calculate 
the magnitude and duration of voltage dips at the monitored site for a number of faults spread 
throughout the system. The method of critical distances calculates fault positions (distance from 
the monitored site) for a given voltage dip magnitude and duration at the monitored site. Dip 
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In the South African context, the initial regulatory framework defined compatibility levels for 
voltage dips in the form of a maximum number of voltage dips per year for each voltage dip type. 
South African utilities have experienced difficulty in complying with the dip limits specified by 
NERSA. Eskom holds regular customer interaction forums with the intention to discuss and solve 
dip problems and other power quality issues. The primary objective of these interactions is to 
demonstrate dip performance against dip limits. 
 
The new regulatory framework was developed in response to the difficulty of managing voltage 
dip performance based on dip limits. This research work was initiated to investigate the feasibility 
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CHAPTER 3:  
VOLTAGE DIP PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
3.1       INTRODUCTION 
 
A utility power quality monitoring programme generally comprises four distinct levels, namely, 
installation of instruments, data retrieval, data storage and reporting tools.  
 
This chapter presents Eskom’s power quality management system and introduces dip 
performance analysis case studies for the two industrial plants.   
 
3.2       ESKOM’S POWER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME 
 
Power quality measurement was introduced by NERSA as part of license conditions [20]. Eskom 
has implemented a comprehensive power quality management program that was initiated in the 
early 1990s [22]. Presently over five hundred sites are being monitored on a continuous basis 
[22]. The measured data is stored in a central power quality database. The power quality data 
management system is summarized in figure 3.1. The selection of QOS meter positions is based 
on the following guidelines provided in [20]. The guidelines are applicable to sites where 
customers are directly connected. 
 Sites are classified into categories based on voltage level (for instance, sites greater than 
44kV and sites greater than 1kV but below or equal to 44kV). 
 Special categories exist for rural networks up to 22kV. The term rural network refers to 
excessively long overhead lines (total line length may reach 400km) supplying mostly 
residential and farming customers. 
 Each category is then allocated a minimum sample size of sites that must be monitored. For 
example, for sites greater than 44kV voltage level, QOS meters must be installed at a 
minimum of 10% of sites within a distribution network. Distribution networks are grouped 
according to the transmission source stations. 
 The utility may decide to install QOS meters as a result of special agreements with the 
customer or as a result of specific customer complaints.  
 
The retrieval of QOS data can be automated or manual. QOS data is stored in a central database, 
which interfaces with Oracle database (Oracle is a master database that holds Eskom’s asset 
location and equipment attribute data). Viewing tools are available for reporting and investigation 
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purposes. For reporting purposes, QOS data is correlated with fault management systems (for 






















Figure 3.1: Architecture of Eskom’s power quality management system [22] 
 
A number of front-end systems have been developed for the reporting and viewing of quality of 
supply data. The Event Viewer tool is of great interest to this study.  
 
Event Viewer allows the user to view graphs, generate reports and extract data associated with 
quality of supply events, as stored in the QOS database. A pre-defined set of selection criteria 
allows the user to view dip data for a single meterpoint or multiple meterpoints (begin date, end 
date, meterpoint). Meterpoint refers to the site where a QOS meter is installed. Event Viewer 
extracts dip data (from the QOS database) for the period defined by begin date and end date. The 
Event Viewer tool presents dip data in the form of a list. By selecting STXYZ Graph option, Event 
Viewer generates a scatter plot of dip data superimposed on the voltage dip window as illustrated 
in figure 3.2. Figure 3.2 was generated by the author to illustrate the viewing function provided by 
Event Viewer tool. The following data can be read off the graph in figure 3.2: 
 12 X1-class dips, 3 X2-class dips, zero Z1-class dips, 2 Z2-class dips, 39 Y-class dips, 2 S-
class dips and 7 T-class dips. 
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Figure 3.2: Event Viewer tool showing STXYZ graph 
 
Profiles for each dip event can be viewed by selecting Phase 1, Phase 2, Phase 3 or All Phases 
tabs in the Dip Profiles menu (available in Event Viewer). Figure 3.3 is an example of a dip profile 
with All Phases tab selected. Figure 3.3 was generated by the author to illustrate the viewing of 
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Figure 3.3: Profile for a voltage dip 
 
3.3       STEEL PLANT CASE STUDY 
 
3.3.1       INTRODUCTION 
 
Voltage dip data was extracted from Eskom’s QOS database (1st January 2003 to 31st December 
2005). Depending on its characteristics, a single voltage dip event may be recorded at multiple 
sites. Multiple recordings of a single dip event are characterized by identical time stamps at all 
monitored sites.  
 
Dip events were analysed by considering the ownership of the network, causes of dips, dip 
classes and costs associated with dip events.  
 
3.3.1.1 Ownership of the Network 
 
Eskom is divided into three main businesses, namely, Distribution, Transmission and Generation. 
The role of each business unit is explained with reference to figure 3.4 below. Distribution 
operates electricity networks in the voltage range 380V to 132kV. The interface between 
Distribution and Transmission is the transmission stations as shown in figure 3.4. Transmission is 
a business unit within Eskom, that operates electricity networks in the voltage range 220kV to 
765kV a.c. and 533kV d.c. Generation operates all power stations owned by Eskom. In the 
context of this study, reference to customers encompasses electricity redistributors 
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(municipalities), mining, industrial, residential, agricultural electricity users, who are supplied from 
Eskom’s distribution or transmission networks.   
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3.3.1.2 Causes of Voltage Dips 
 
The causes of the dips are determined through a process called dip-to-trip matching. Dip-to-trip 
matching involves comparison of the time stamps of voltage dip events (from Event Viewer) 
against network events associated with circuit breaker trips. Breaker trip information is captured in 
two fault management systems, namely, NEPS (Network and Equipment Performance System) 
and TIPPS (Transmission Information Plant Performance System).  
 
3.3.1.3 Dip Classes 
 
The severity of a voltage dip event is characterized by its magnitude and duration. It is generally 
accepted that customer plant can withstand dips of small magnitude (Y-class dips) since these 
events occur frequently on the utility network. However, severe dips (Z1-class, Z2-class and T-
class) may affect operation of the plant negatively and therefore, are of particular interest to the 
customer and the utility.  
 
3.3.1.4 Voltage Dip Costs 
 
Customer surveys have gradually gained acceptance as the most effective technique to evaluate 
the costs of voltage dips to the customer. With this technique, customers are requested to 
estimate their costs due to dip events of varying duration and magnitude. A disturbance such as a 
voltage dip can cause customer plant to malfunction or shut down after which a time-dependent 
restart procedure is needed. Most industrial customers track costs related to voltage dips and 
interruptions. 
 
3.3.2 SUPPLY NETWORK FOR THE STEEL PLANT 
 
Analysis of voltage dip performance for the steel plant is based on the network diagram shown in 
figure 3.5. The monitored site (steel plant) is supplied from Mill Scaw 88/6.6kV 4 x 20MVA 
substation, shown using a ‘red fault’ symbol. The distribution network (380V to 132kV) interfaces 
with transmission network at two nodes: Jupiter 275kV busbar and Eiger 275kV busbar. In figure 
3.5, networks of different voltage levels are represented by different colours. Sites where QOS 
meters are installed, are marked by a ‘red square’ symbol. The meters are installed on the 
secondary side of the voltage transformers. NERSA requires utilities to install suitable measuring 
instruments at sufficient locations in their electrical networks to adequately characterize and report 
on dip performance. The guidelines for the selection of QOS meter locations are discussed in 
section 3.2. 
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3.3.3       RESULTS 
 
This section presents results on the dip performance analysis performed for the network shown in 
figure 3.5. Dip data for the meter locations (Mill Scaw 88kV, Jupiter 275kV, Eiger 88kV and Union 
88kV) was extracted from the QOS database.    
 
 
3.3.3.1      Ownership of the Network 
 
With reference to figure 3.5, faults causing dips at the monitored site (Mill Scaw) occur on the 
distribution network (6.6kV to 88kV) or transmission network (275kV) or at the customer’s plant 
(not shown). It is important to compare voltage dip performance on the transmission and 
distribution networks since these networks are operated by different business units within Eskom. 
In figure 3.5, the 275kV network is the transmission network, while the rest is the distribution 
network. Transmission and distribution networks interface at Jupiter and Eiger stations.  
 
A distribution of dip events according to ownership of the network is shown in figure 3.6. The 
vertical axis represents the number of dip events recorded. The horizontal axis represents dip 
types, grouped according to the owner of the electrical network where the dips occurred. 
Customer, distribution and transmission refer to dip events that occurred on the customer’s plant, 
distribution networks and transmission networks, respectively. In the event that the origin of 
voltage dips cannot be verified accurately, the ‘unknown’ category is assigned to those dip events. 
Where there are no bins for specific dip types, it means that there are zero dip events recorded 
during the analysis window period.    
 
Figure 3.6 was generated by exporting dip data from the QOS database (using Event Viewer) to 
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of dip events for the steel plant 
 
In figure 3.6, the smallest number of long-duration dip events (T-class, Z1-class and Z2-class) is 
observed on the transmission networks. This observation is attributed to typical tripping times for 
protection systems at transmission voltages being less than 150ms. The large number of T-class 
dips on distribution networks can be attributed to faults clearing via back-up protection, in case of 
failure of the main protection systems.    
 
3.3.3.2       Causes of Voltage Dips 
 
The causes of dip events are determined through a dip-to-trip matching exercise. In this exercise, 
dip records from the QOS database are correlated with circuit breaker trip events extracted from 
NEPS. A breaker trip (within the network under investigation) is then matched to a dip event if the 
time stamps for the two events are the same. The causes of faults that result in voltage dips are 
verified by field operators who are responsible for fault-finding, operation and maintenance tasks. 
 
Figure 3.7 presents causes of dips arranged in descending order from highest to lowest count. 
The vertical axis represents the number of dip events recorded. The horizontal axis represents 
categories of dip causes. Dips caused as a result of inclement weather conditions or lightning are 
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grouped under storm-related category. Conductor-related category includes dips whose origin can 
be traced to the breaking of conductor (usually at the jumper where two conductors are joined) or 
vandalism resulting in the breaking of conductor. Customer-related category refers to dip events 
that occurred within the customer’s plant. Human-related category represents dip events that are 
caused by incidents such as a car driving onto a tower, damage of cables while excavating for 
road works and other similar incidents.  
 
The graph in figure 3.7 was generated by adding a ‘cause’ column (in Excel) to the dip data 































































































































Figure 3.7: Causes of voltage dips for the steel plant 
 
In figure 3.7, the first six categories contributed 73% of dip events during the period from 2003 to 
2005 (73% is derived from the summation of first 6 categories divided by total dip count). Figure 
3.7 enables the customer (steel plant in this instance) to request the utility to further investigate 
the following issues: 
 Ability of the network to withstand lightning and other forms of extreme weather conditions. 
 Reasons why network equipment is failing (could failures be related to age, vandalism etc?). 
 Actions taken by the utility to limit veld fires and theft of conductor. 
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The number of dip events with unknown causes is relatively large, which makes it impossible to 
initiate corrective action. Figure 3.7 informs the utility to review its fault management practices to 
reduce the number of dip causes in the ‘unknown’ category. 
 
Figure 3.8 shows a breakdown of dip causes per circuit for various categories of dip causes. The 
graph was generated using Excel’s pivot table functionality. The vertical axis represents the 
number of dip events. The horizontal axis represents overhead lines and substation equipment 
where faults resulting in dips, occurred as recorded in the QOS database. With reference to figure 
3.8, an 88kV line that joins Germiston South substation and Tailings Booster substation is named 
Germiston South/Tailings Booster 88kV HV overhead line. The bin labelled South West Vertical 
TRFR 2AB 44/3.3kV TRFR Bay must be interpreted as follows: 
 Two faults causing dips at the monitored site occurred at South West Vertical substation. 
 The two faults occurred on transformer 2AB bay (for example, catastrophic failure of a current 
transformer). 
 
The circuits shown in figure 3.8 represent segments of the network under analysis (figure 3.5). 
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  Figure 3.8: Breakdown of dip causes per contributing circuit – steel plant 
 
From figure 3.8, it can be deduced that the location of a relatively large number of faults causing 
dips, is not known. Depending on the severity of dips, the utility may be requested by the 
customer to review its fault investigation practices. Ignoring the unknown category, the largest 
number of dips occurred on the Germiston South/Tailings Booster 88kV line as a result of 
conductor theft and conductor-related incidents. Conductor thieves either cut the conductor live 
(using tools similar to those used by Eskom’s live work teams) or shoot the conductor, causing the 
breakers to trip on single-phase fault. It is this initial part of the theft operation that causes a 
voltage dip. Conductor-related incidents occurred mainly on Germiston South/Tailings Booster 
88kV lines. According to the investigation conducted in 2004 [24], the root causes of conductor-
related incidents were determined to be: 
 Mechanical failure of shieldwires (stranded steel conductor) due to continuous exposure to 
corrosive chemical vapours in the vicinity of the line. 
 Bridging of airgap between live conductor (jumpers) and steel towers due to the jumpers being 
excessively long and not supported by insulators, on certain towers. 
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Figure 3.8 answers two important questions: 
 On which circuits do the dips occur and what are the causes?  
 How do different circuits rank against each other in terms of dip performance? 
 
The first four circuits (from left to right) contribute 70% of dip events (70% is derived from 
summation of dip events on the first four circuits and dividing by the total dip count for all circuits). 
Information presented in figure 3.8 enables the utility to make informed decisions around its 
maintenance program: 
 Replacing steel shieldwires on its overhead lines (Germiston South/Tailings Booster line). 
 Limiting conductor theft incidents on the Germiston South/Tailings Booster and Union 
DS/Jupiter 88kV lines (for instance, installing sensors to detect open-circuit conditions).  
 
According to figure 3.8, the list of circuits affecting dip performance of the monitored site, excludes 
Eiger 88kV network. This observation is attributed to the network configuration at the time of 
performing the analysis. The Union DS network is supplied from Jupiter source only, under normal 
operating conditions [24] (normal operating condition refers to the absence of major electrical 
faults where all circuits and transformers are available for energy transfer). 
 
3.3.3.3 Dip Classes 
 
Dip data was exported from the database to a spreadsheet environment for processing. The data 
was presented graphically in figure 3.9 using Excel. 
 
The vertical axis represents the number of dip events for the selected period (2003 to 2005). The 
horizontal axis represents circuits where dip events occurred, ranked in descending order from left 
to right.   
 






















































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.9: Dip types versus contributing circuits – steel plant 
 
Long-duration dip events (T-class, Z1-class, Z2-class and S-class dips) occur predominantly on 
Germiston South/Tailings Booster, Union DS/Jupiter and Germiston South/SAR Rooikop 
overhead lines. The plant audit conducted by the author on the Union DS 88kV network, revealed 
that the protection system is outdated and prone to failure while product support has also ceased 
to exist [25], [26]. A business case for the upgrading of control plant technology at Germiston 
South, Mill Scaw and Union DS was prepared and submitted to approval authorities [27], [28]. The 
relay-based protection technology has, over the years, evolved from phase-1 relays 
(electromagnetic relay technology) to phase-4 relays (digital programmable relay technology). On 
the other hand, the original phase-1 relays installed at Union DS, Germiston South and Mill Scaw 
substations, have been in operation for a period exceeding 30 years. 
 
Figure 3.9 is of particular interest to both the utility and the customer for the following reasons: 
 Circuits where long-duration dip events occur can be identified. Long-duration dip events are 
of particular concern to the steel plant customer. With this information, the utility can embark 
on line audits and detailed line performance investigations to limit the number and the duration 
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of dip events on Germiston South/Tailings Booster, Union DS/Jupiter and Germiston 
South/SAR Rooikop overhead lines.  
 The locations of faults that caused five long-duration dip events (Z1-class under ‘unknown’ 
category) are not known. With this information, the customer is able to insist on improvement 
of fault management practices on the side of the utility.    
 
3.3.3.4       Voltage Dip Costs 
 
To ascertain dip-related costs, customers are requested to estimate their costs due to dip events 
of varying duration and magnitude. On consultation, the customer was not able to provide reliable 
dip-related cost data for the plant under study. 
 
3.4       THE PAPER PLANT CASE STUDY 
 
3.4.1       INTRODUCTION 
 
The dip data was extracted from Eskom’s QOS database (1st January 2003 to 31st December 
2005). Dip incidents were analysed by considering the ownership of the network, causes of dips, 
dip classes and costs associated with dip events.  
 
3.4.1.1 Ownership of the Network 
 
It is important to conduct a comparative dip performance study between distribution and 
transmission networks for two reasons: 
1. Transmission and distribution networks are operated and maintained by different business 
units within Eskom. 
2. Faults on the transmission network cause dips over a wider area of the network compared to 
faults on the distribution networks.  
 
3.4.1.2 Causes of Voltage Dips 
 
The causes of voltage dips are determined using the dip-to-trip matching technique. The dip data 
resides in the QOS database (viewed via Event Viewer) and the breaker trip information resides in 
the fault managements systems (NEPS and TIPPS). The two sets of data are correlated using the 
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3.4.1.3 Dip Classes 
 
Long-duration dip events (T-class, Z1-class and Z2-class) are of particular interest to the pulp and 
paper customer. Therefore the analysis identifies circuits where these long-duration dip events 
occur.  
 
3.4.1.4 Voltage Dip Costs 
 
To evaluate dip related costs, customers are requested by the utility to estimate plant downtime 
costs as a direct result of voltage dips.  
 
3.4.2 SUPPLY NETWORK FOR THE PAPER PLANT 
 
Voltage dip performance analysis for the paper plant is based on the network diagram shown in 
figure 3.10. The monitored site (paper plant) is supplied from Enstra substation, demarcated with 
a ‘red fault’ symbol. The distribution network (44kV to 132kV) interfaces with the transmission 
network (275kV) at Nevis station. The transmission network upstream of Nevis was not analysed 
for the following reasons: 
 Dip events on the circuits supplying Nevis are relatively infrequent compared to dip events 
caused by faults on the distribution network. 
 There is more than one source of supply to Nevis. Should a fault occur on one circuit, three 
sources are available to maintain supply to the distribution network. 
 
In figure 3.10, networks of different voltage levels are represented by different colours. Sites 
where QOS meters are installed, are marked by a ‘red square’ symbol.  The QOS meters are 
installed on the secondary side of the voltage transformers. The selection of meter locations is 





















































































FIGURE 3.10: Supply network for the pulp and paper plant
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3.4.3       RESULTS  
 
This section presents results on the dip performance analysis performed for the network shown in 
figure 3.10. Dip data for the meter locations (Nevis 275kV, Struben DS 44kV, Delmas Munuc 
44kV and Enstra 132kV) was extracted from the QOS database.  
 
3.4.3.1       Ownership of Infrastructure 
 
In the network diagram of figure 3.10, network faults causing dips at the monitored site (Enstra 
marked with a ‘red fault’ symbol) may occur on the distribution network (44kV to 132kV) or 
transmission network (275kV) or at the customers’ plant (customer networks not shown).  
 
A distribution of dip events according to ownership of the network is shown in figure 3.11. In figure 
3.11, distribution means that dip events originated in the part of the network operated by the 
Distribution unit of Eskom. The same interpretation is applicable to the transmission network 
(operated by the Transmission unit of Eskom). ‘Customer’ means that dip events have their origin 
in the customer’s plant. If the origin of the dip events cannot be ascertained, the ‘unknown’ 
category is assigned.  
 
The vertical axis represents the number of dip events recorded. The horizontal axis represents dip 
types, grouped according to the owner of the electrical network where the dips occurred. Where 
there are no bins for specific dip types, it means that there are zero dip events recorded during 
the analysis window period.    
 
Figure 3.11 was generated by exporting dip data from the QOS database to a spreadsheet 
environment (Excel). Excel’s chart wizard was then used to present the data graphically.  
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Figure 3.11: Distribution of dip events for the paper plant 
 
In figure 3.11, it is apparent that voltage dip events recorded at Enstra originate predominantly 
from the distribution networks. Faults on the distribution networks resulted in a large number of 
long-duration events (T-class and Z2-class) at the monitored site. The total number of dip events 
seems to be progressively decreasing from 2003 to 2005. 
 
Information presented in figure 3.11 enables the utility and its customers to answer the following 
questions: 
 Which Eskom entity operates the networks where dips predominantly originate? In this case, 
undesirable dip performance seems to be associated with the Distribution unit of Eskom. 
 How does dip performance compare from year to year? The utility appears to have developed 
an effective dip performance improvement strategy. Dip performance has progressively 
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3.4.3.2       Causes of Dip Events 
 
The causes of voltage dips are ascertained using two sets of data: QOS database viewed via 
Event Viewer and NEPS circuit breaker trip data. The two sets of data are correlated using the 
time stamp to indicate related events. 
 
Figure 3.12 presents the distribution of dip events according to dip cause category, arranged in 
descending order from left to right. The vertical axis represents the number of dip events recorded 




















Figure 3.12: Causes of voltage dips for paper plant 
 
In figure 3.12, the most important contributing factors to dip performance are conductor theft, 
conductor-related, storm-related and veld fire incidents. The four dip cause categories are 
responsible for over 35 dip events between 2003 and 2005 (adding totals for all four categories). 
More than 20 dip events are attributed to conductor theft incidents. Conductor thieves shoot the 
conductor or cut it live resulting in a single-phase fault. It is this initial act of the theft operation that 
causes voltage dips. The large number of conductor theft incidents experienced in 2003 requires 
further discussion. In [21], Smith discusses efforts taken by the utility (Eskom) to reduce the 
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number of conductor theft incidents on the distribution networks shown in figure 3.10. Figure 3.13 
is reproduced here from [21]. The vertical axis represents the number of conductor theft incidents. 
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Figure 3.13: Decreasing trends in conductor theft incidents [21] 
 
Prior to October 2002, Eskom employed security personnel to physically guard the lines known to 
be targeted by conductor thieves. From October 2002 to May 2005, Eskom installed electronic 
sensors on its lines where conductor theft incidents were known to have occurred. The electronic 
sensors detected open-circuit conditions and sent alarm signals to the network control centre. On 
receipt of alarm signals, network control centre personnel dispatched armed security guards to 
the location indicated by the electronic devices installed on the lines. This initiative significantly 
reduced the number of conductor theft incidents between 2002 and 2005, which explains the 
improvement in dip performance (2003 to 2005) observed in the figures 3.11 and 3.12.    
 
The identification of key causes of dip events enables the utility and the customer to discuss: 
 Progress of activities initiated by the utility to limit the number and the frequency of faults that 
cause dips. 
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 Maintenance efforts focussing on the most important dip cause categories. In figure 3.12, the 
major categories are conductor theft, conductor-related, storm-related and veld fire faults.  
 
Figure 3.14 shows a breakdown of dip causes per circuit for various categories of dip causes. The 
graph was generated using Excel’s chart wizard. The vertical axis represents the number of dip 
events recorded. The horizontal axis represents circuits where faults resulting in dips at the 
monitored site, occurred during the selected window period. Figure 3.14 is to be interpreted as 
follows: 
 The ‘unknown’ category means that the location of the faults could not be ascertained.  
 The bin labelled Benoni/Nevis 1 132kV HV overhead line represents dip events caused by 
faults that occurred on any part of the Benoni/Nevis 132kV line (circuit number 1). 
 The bin labelled SAPPI/Nevis 1 132kV BKR represents dip events caused by faults that 
occurred on the SAPPI/Nevis 1 132kV overhead line. The additional information is that the 
132kV Nevis 1 circuit breaker (installed at SAPPI substation) is known to have tripped for 
these faults. 
 The bin labelled SAPPI/TEE 1 132kV overhead conductor represents faults that occurred on 


























































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.14: Breakdown of dip causes per contributing circuit – paper plant 
 
Faults causing dips at the monitored site occurred predominantly on Benoni/Nevis 1 132kV and 
SAPPI/Tee 1 132kV overhead lines. Conductor theft incidents are the most common dip cause 
category on the three circuits (total of 14 conductor theft incidents).  
 
Figure 3.14 informs the utility of the circuits where voltage dips occur and related causes. The 
utility can use this information to prioritize maintenance actions on its overhead lines.  
 
3.4.3.3 Dip Classes 
 
The author extracted dip class data directly from the QOS database via Event Viewer and then 
downloaded it to a spreadsheet environment. The extracted data was presented graphically in 
figure 3.15 using Excel. The vertical axis represents dip events recorded. The horizontal axis 
represents bins described by the circuits where dip events occurred. Where there are no bins for 
certain dip classes, the interpretation is that dips of that specific class did not occur during the 
analysis period.  
 















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.15: Dip types versus contributing circuits – paper plant 
 
Long-duration dip events (Z2-class and T-class) occurred predominantly on Benoni/Nevis 1 
132kV line and SAPPI/Tee 132kV line. Figure 3.15 enables the utility to identify circuits where 
long-duration dip events occur.  
 
3.4.3.4       Voltage Dip Costs 
 
The tracking of dip-related plant downtime and dips costs is an important tool in quantifying the 
impact of voltage dips to the customer. Figure 3.16 is an attempt to quantify the financial impact of 
voltage dips for the paper plant. The vertical axis represents costs as a direct result of voltage 
dips (downtime costs excluding consequential costs). The horizontal axis represents circuits 
contributing to dip costs.  
 
Dip costs were obtained from the paper plant customer [29]. The customer records estimated 
costs associated with each dip event. Dip data was downloaded from the QOS database. The 
graph of figure 3.16 is produced using Excel. Figure 3.16 is to be interpreted as follows: 
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 Benoni DS/Nevis 1 132kV BKR represents dip costs as a result of faults that occurred on the 
Benoni DS/Nevis 1 132kV overhead line. Nevis 1 132kV circuit breaker (installed at Benoni 
DS) is known to have tripped for these faults. 
 Delmas/Nevis 2 132kV HV overhead line represents dip costs as a result of faults (resulting in 
dips at Enstra) at any part of the second 132kV line between Delmas DS and Nevis 
transmission station (the convention is to count circuits from left to right on the network 





















































Figure 3.16: Circuits contributing to dip costs – paper plant 
 
Figure 3.16 suggests that faults on the Benoni/Nevis 1 132kV overhead line and SAPPI 
substation resulted in the highest dip-related financial losses to the paper customer. The highest 
financial loss was experienced in 2003. Figure 3.16 enables the customer to identify circuits 
contributing to dip-related downtime costs. Based on this information, the utility is able to make 
informed dip performance investment decisions while on the other hand, the customer may decide 
to investigate other dip mitigation options.  
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Figure 3.17 shows costs of voltage dips against dip cause categories. Dip data was obtained from 
Eskom’s QOS database, while dip costs were obtained from the customer. The graph was 
generated using Excel. The vertical axis represents costs as a direct result of voltage dips. The 
























Figure 3.17: Causes of dips and the associated costs – paper plant 
 
Figure 3.17 suggests that dips due to conductor theft incidents resulted in the highest financial 
losses to the customer. The lowest level of dip-related costs is approximately fifty thousand rands, 
which suggests that all dip cause categories have a remarkable financial impact on the customer.   
 
Figure 3.18 shows a plot of dip costs as a function of dip duration and dip magnitude. The vertical 
axis represents costs as a direct result of voltage dips. The two horizontal axes represent dip 
depth (measured as a percentage of declared voltage) and dip duration (in milliseconds). The 
graph was produced using Excel’s chart wizard. The labels in the horizontal axes represent 
different ranges of dip magnitude and dip duration. For example, T5(150-<600ms) refers to bin T5 
defined by the dip duration falling between 150ms and 600ms and D2(30-<40%) represents bin 
D2 defined by dip magnitude in the range 30% to 40%.  
 


































Figure 3.18: Dip costs as a function of dip duration and magnitude – paper plant 
 
In figure 3.18, long-duration dips (duration exceeding 150ms) have relatively more severe 
financial impact on the customer. Dip events of varying magnitudes appear to have financial 
impact ranging from one extreme of severity to the other.  
 
Figure 3.18 is an additional view of dip performance that the customer and the utility can use to 




Power quality monitoring was introduced by NERSA as part of license conditions. Eskom’s 
measured dip data is stored in a central database. Eskom has developed software tools for the 
viewing and reporting of dip information. For both the steel plant and paper plant, the dip data was 
 
 - 82 -
analysed by considering the ownership of the network, causes of dips, dip classes and costs 
associated with dip events.  
 
For the steel plant, a distribution of dip events according to ownership of the network, revealed 
that a large number of T-class dips occurred on the distribution network. This observation is 
attributed to faults clearing via back-up protection, in case of failure of the main protection 
systems. A breakdown of fault causes showed that storm-related faults, equipment failures, 
conductor-related faults and conductor theft incidents form the greatest contribution to dip 
performance of the monitored site. The largest number of dips occurred on the Germiston 
South/Tailings Booster and Union DS/Jupiter 88kV overhead lines. Long-duration dip events (T-
class, Z1-class, Z2-class and S-class) occurred predominantly on Germiston South/Tailings 
Booster, Union DS/Jupiter and Germiston South/SAR Rooikop 88kV lines. The identification of 
problematic circuits allows the utility to address the causes of electrical faults more decisively. 
 
For the paper plant, faults on the distribution network resulted in long-duration dip events (T-class 
and Z2-class) at the monitored site (Enstra). A presentation of dip causes shows that conductor 
theft incidents, conductor-related faults, storm-related faults and veld fires contributed significantly 
to dip performance of the monitored site. Network faults occurred predominantly on Benoni/Nevis 
1 and SAPPI/Tee 1 132kV overhead lines. Long-duration dip events (Z2-class and T-class) also 
occurred predominantly on the same circuits. Faults on the Benoni/Nevis 1 132kV line (mainly 
conductor theft) and SAPPI substation resulted in the highest financial losses (exceeding 
R800,000 in 2003). For the paper plant, dip events of varying magnitude appear to have financial 
impact ranging from one extreme of severity to the other (from under R50,000 to over R800,000). 
This observation is attributed to the possibility that the dip costs may have been derived primarily 
from rough estimates. 
 
For both industrial plants, the analysis of dip performance has successfully identified circuits 
where dips predominantly occur and ascertained the causes of these dip events. This information 
(problematic circuits, fault causes, dip types) enables the utility and the customer to jointly 
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CHAPTER 4: 
VOLTAGE DIP SIMULATION 
 
4.1       INTRODUCTION 
 
The r.m.s voltage depression caused by a fault propagates through the network and manifests 
itself as a voltage dip at remote observation points. The effects, in terms of voltage dips, of a fault 
at a given position can be represented graphically in a single-line diagram of the power system. 
The resulting single-line diagram is called the dip influence zone.  
 
4.1.1 THE SIMULATION TOOL 
 
DIgSILENT PowerFactory was selected as the simulation tool. The choice of DIgSILENT 
PowerFactory was motivated by ease of availability within the Eskom environment. PowerFactory 
uses sophisticated multilevel modelling of the power system and can cover the whole range of 
transient phenomena in electrical power systems [30]. Three different simulation functions are 
available to study fault levels in a power system, namely: 
 A basic steady-state function that uses a symmetrical steady-state network model under 
balanced network conditions. Only the fundamental components of voltages and currents are 
taken into consideration. 
 A three-phase steady-state function that uses a steady-state network model under both 
balanced and unbalanced conditions.  
 An electromagnetic transient model that uses a dynamic network model for short-term and 
mid-term transients under both balanced and unbalanced network conditions.  
 
The simulation of voltage dips was performed within the following boundaries: 
 Only dip events caused by short-circuits are of interest to this study. 
 Protection systems including auto-reclose settings are not simulated. Thus, the expected 
simulation results are limited to fault distances and magnitudes only. 
 Multiple fault conditions are not simulated. 
 
The power system models for the steel plant and paper plant were created in PowerFactory. 
Lumped parameter models were employed to model underground cables and overhead lines. 
Sequence impedances, tower top geometries, underground cable data (core size, configuration) 
and current ratings were obtained from Eskom’s conductor data tables [31].  
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4.1.2 DIP MACROS AND DIP INFLUENCE ZONES 
The following process was adopted in performing dip simulations: 
 Building a model of the power system that includes busbars of interest and parts of the system 
that feed these busbars.  
 Using DIgSILENT PowerFactory macros to define dip influence zones for the two monitored 
sites. The macros were developed by Schilder [32] and are discussed below. 
 The simulation results are presented graphically on the power system to give dip influence 
zones for each plant.  
 
Schilder [32] conducted a research study to develop macros and guidelines for dip performance 
studies, using DIgSILENT PowerFactory as the simulation tool. In [32] several macros, including 
the Area of Sensitivity macro, were successfully developed and tested. The author of this thesis 
used results of the research conducted in [32] to calculate dip influence zones for the steel plant 
and the paper plant, specifically the Area of Sensitivity macro. The macro uses the method of 
critical distances to calculate dip influence zone for a selected monitored busbar.  
 
The Area of Sensitivity macros works as follows: 
 Four input parameters may be specified (shown in figure 4.1 below), namely: 
o Fault resistance (represented by symbol Zf in the macro). 
o Voltage dip sensitivity in per unit (represented by symbol Vsens). 
o Type of fault (0 refers to three-phase fault, 1 refers to single-line-to-ground fault, 2 
refers to line-to-line-to-ground fault, 3 refers to line-to-line fault). 
o Method of short-circuit calculation. 
 With the input parameters set up, the user then selects lines of interest (multiple lines selected 
simultaneously). The macro applies specified input parameters at predefined locations on 
each single selected line, one at a time. For each location on each selected line, the remaining 
voltage at the monitored site is calculated and compared with Vsens. If the calculated 
remaining voltage is smaller (less severe) than Vsens, the macro stops doing calculations for 
this fault location and proceeds to the next location. The point on a line at which the 
calculation is stopped marks the boundary of the dip influence zone on that line for the given 
set of input values. The macro calculates voltage values (remaining voltage), first on the lines 
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Figure 4.1: Input Dialog Box of Area of Sensitivity Macro [32] 
 
 The output of the macro is a list of lines falling within the dip influence zone defined by the 
input parameters. The macro gives line distances (relative to the monitored site) for each line 
in the dip influence zone. The distance on each line is the point at which the zone ends. An 
example of the output of the Area of Sensitivity macro is presented in figure 4.2. The output 
window shows the monitored site (Enstra in this case) and lines in the dip influence zone 
defined by the input parameters. 
 Once a dip influence zone is defined, one or more input parameters may be changed and the 










Figure 4.2: Example of output of Area of Sensitivity macro 
 
The dip influence zone is obtained by representing the fault distances graphically on the network, 
for each monitored site. The basic steps to produce dip influence zones are summarised as 
follows: 
(1) Model the appropriate network in a power system simulation tool (PowerFactory). 
(2) Use the Import function of PowerFactory to import the DPL (DIgSILENT Programming 
Language) macros, specifically the Area of Sensitivity macro developed in [32]. 
(3) Select the busbar to be monitored. Thereafter, select all circuits where the influence of faults 
on the monitored busbar is to be determined. 
(4) Right-click the mouse while the cursor is on one of the selected objects. Select Execute DPL 
scripts on the right-click menu. 
(5) Select the DipSensitivity macro. 
(6) Provide input data for the macro, that is, fault resistance, dip sensitivity (remaining voltage), 
fault type and method of fault calculation, as illustrated in figure 4.1. 
(7) Press Execute button. 
Number of line(s) in selection:  4 
Calculating short-circuits... 
Fault type selected: 2-Phase Short-Circuit 
  
Dip sensitivity for monitored site Enstra132: 
  
Results for line Benoni_Bpp/Modder East T_, of length 15.25 km 
Fault resistance is 0.00 ohm and dip sensitivity 0.10 pu 
Fault distance is 0.00 km, remaining voltage is 0.58 pu 
  
Results for line Benoni_Bpp/Modder East T_Modder East, of length 0.38 km 
Fault resistance is 0.00 ohm and dip sensitivity 0.10 pu 
Fault distance is 0.00 km, remaining voltage is 0.60 pu 
  
Results for line Benoni_Enstra/Modder East T_Modder East, of length 0.38 km 
Fault resistance is 0.00 ohm and dip sensitivity 0.10 pu 
Fault distance is 0.00 km, remaining voltage is 0.50 pu 
  
Results for line Benoni_Enstra/Modder East T_, of length 15.29 km 
Fault resistance is 0.00 ohm and dip sensitivity 0.10 pu 
Fault distance is 0.00 km, remaining voltage is 0.50 pu 
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(8) The results appear as a list of lines that form part of the dip influence zones. Distances on the 
lines are shown (boundaries of the exposed area). 
(9) Repeat steps (6) to (8) for a selected range of Vsens values as well as for different short-
circuit types. 
(10) Plot fault distances on the selected lines. For each fault type, dip influence zones are then 
obtained by joining the points (fault distances). These zones are dependent on the dip 
sensitivity set at the monitored site. 
 
4.2      SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
4.2.1     INTRODUCTION TO THE SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
The simulation results discussed in section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 were generated by the author using 
the Area of Sensitivity macro. To explain how the dip influence zones were plotted consider the 
output of the macro shown in figure 4.3. Figure 4.3 restates the macro input data as follows: 
 Fault type is 2-phase short-circuit (phase-to-phase). 
 Fault resistance is zero. 
 Dip sensitivity at the monitored site is 0.5pu. 
 
Number of line(s) in selection: 48 
Calculating short-circuits... 
Fault type selected: 2-Phase Short-Circuit 
  
Dip sensitivity for monitored site Mill Scaw88kV: 
  
Results for line Union_Mill Scaw 88kV, of length 0.17 km 
Fault resistance is 0.00 ohm and dip sensitivity 0.50 pu 
Fault distance is 0.17 km, remaining voltage is 0.50 pu 
  
Results for line Germiston South_Tailings Booster 88kV, of length 1.94 km 
Fault resistance is 0.00 ohm and dip sensitivity 0.50 pu 
Fault distance is 1.10 km, remaining voltage is 0.50 pu 
 
Results for line Germiston Factories_South West Vertical (1) 44kV, of length 0.51 km 
Fault resistance is 0.00 ohm and dip sensitivity 0.50 pu 
Fault distance is 0.00 km, remaining voltage is 0.69 pu  
Figure 4.3: Example of macro outputs used to plot dip influence zones 
 
The results are to be interpreted as follows: 
 The entire Union DS/Mill Scaw 88kV line is part of the dip zone defined by the parameters set 
above (Zf = 0, Vsens = 0.5, fault type = phase-to-phase). Union DS/Mill Scaw line is 0.17km 
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long and 100% of this line length forms part of the dip zone defined by the input parameters 
(fault distance is 0.17km). The remaining voltage at the monitored site (Mill Scaw) is 0.5pu.  
 Germiston South/Tailings Booster 88kV line is 1.94km long and only 1.10km of the line forms 
part of the dip influence zone under investigation (fault distance is 1.10km). The macro 
assumes that the reference point (zero point) is the one closest to the monitored site (that is, 
Germiston South 88kV busbar in the case of Germiston South/Tailings Booster line). To plot 
the point 1.10km on the 1.94km long Germiston South/Tailings Booster line, the macro output 
distance was expressed as a fraction of the total line length (1.10km converts to 57% for a 
1.94km long line). A complete dip influence zone can then be plotted by joining the points on 
all lines which form part of the dip influence zone. 
 Germiston Factories/South West Vertical 1 is 0.51km long and is outside of the dip influence 
zone defined by the macro input parameters (fault distance is 0.0km). The remaining voltage 
at the monitored site 0.69pu, which is less severe than the setting of 0.5pu dip sensitivity. 
 
4.2.2      STEEL PLANT 
 
4.2.2.1       Phase-to-phase Faults 
 
The network diagram shown in figure 4.4 is part of the network presented in figure 3.5. At the time 
of performing the analysis, the Union DS network was supplied from Jupiter source only, under 
normal operating conditions. The dip influence zones are plotted on the network diagram by 
joining fault distances produced by the Area of Sensitivity macro. 
 
Three zones are shown for dip sensitivities of 0.5pu, 0.3pu and 0.1pu. Using figure 4.4 as an 
example, dip influence zones are to be interpreted as follows: 
 Phase-to-phase faults occurring on the network enclosed by Zone A (ph-ph) will result in 
voltage dips more severe than 0.5pu, at the monitored site (minimum expected dip depth is 
0.5pu). 
 For circuits that are partially enclosed within Zone A (ph-ph) (for example, Jupiter/Simmerpan 
44kV lines), the above condition is only applicable up to the critical distances.  
 Phase-to-phase faults occurring in Zone B (ph-ph) will result in voltage dips more severe than 
0.3pu at the monitored site (minimum expected dip depth is 0.3pu). 
 Phase-to-phase faults occurring in Zone C (ph-ph) will result in voltage dips more severe than 
0.1pu at the monitored site (minimum expected dip depth is 0.1pu). 
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 Phase-to-phase faults occurring on networks not enclosed by any of the zones will not result in 
voltage dips at the monitored site. It is assumed that ‘voltage dips’ less than 0.1pu in 
magnitude have no effect on customer plant and are therefore ignored.  
 
Phase-to-phase faults on any part of the 88kV network cause dips more severe than 0.3pu at the 
monitored site. Phase-to-phase faults on Angelo, Cason Mill and Simmerpan 11kV network, do 
not cause voltage dips at Mill Scaw (remaining voltage still exceeds 0.9pu). 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Dip influence zones for phase-to-phase faults – steel plant 
 
4.2.2.2       Single-phase Faults 
 
Four dip influence zones for single-phase faults are shown in figure 4.5. Single-phase faults 
causing dips with magnitude of at least 0.8pu (Zone A (1-ph)), occur in much smaller area 
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significance of this observation is that single-phase faults occur more frequently than phase-to-







Figure 4.5: Dip influence zones for single-phase faults – steel plant 
 
The Simmerpan/Germiston Munic 88kV circuits (oil-filled single-core cables in flat formation) form 
part of Zone B (1-ph). The average performance of these underground cables was calculated to 
be two faults per kilometre per annum in 2005 [33]. This statistic translates to an average of four 
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4.2.2.3       Phase-to-phase-to-ground Faults 
 
The dip influence zones for phase-to-phase-to-ground faults are shown in figure 4.6. Phase-to-
phase-to-ground faults on the 88kV network cause dips exceeding 0.7pu (Zone B (ph-ph-g)) while 
phase-to-phase faults on the same network area cause dips exceeding 0.3pu (Zone B (ph-ph)) at 
the monitored site. It therefore appears that the customer plant is more sensitive to phase-to-




Figure 4.6: Dip influence zones for phase-to-phase-to-ground faults – steel plant 
 
4.2.2.4.       Three-phase Faults 
 
The dip influence zones for three-phase faults are shown in figure 4.7. Three-phase faults on 
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at the monitored site (Zone B (3-ph)). These two lines were identified as the worst-performing 
circuits in terms of dip performance (figure 3.8 in section 3.3.3.2).  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Dip influence zones for three-phase faults – steel plant 
 
4.2.3       THE PAPER PLANT 
 
4.2.3.1       Phase-to-phase Faults 
 
Figure 4.8 shows dip influence zones for phase-to-phase faults. Phase-to-phase faults within 
Zone A (ph-ph) cause dips of at least 0.5pu in magnitude at Enstra substation. Zone A (ph-ph) 
covers part of the 132kV networks. It is therefore expected that maintenance initiatives focussing 
on the Nevis/Struben lines and Benoni DS/Nevis lines will improve dip performance at the 
examined site. Phase-to-phase faults on the 44kV network only have a moderate impact on the 
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Figure 4.8: Dip influence zones for phase-to-phase faults – paper plant 
 
 
4.2.3.2      Single-phase Faults 
 
Voltage dip sensitivity areas for single-phase faults are presented in figure 4.9. SAPPI and Enstra 
substations are situated in an industrial area. In response to frequent flashover incidents (single-
phase faults) as a result of industrial pollutants, maintenance projects were initiated to coat 
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Figure 4.9: Dip influence zones for single-phase faults – paper plant 
 
4.2.3.3      Phase-to-phase-to-ground Faults 
 
Dip influence zones for phase-to-phase-to-ground faults are depicted in figure 4.10. For the same 
voltage dip sensitivity at Enstra (for example, dip sensitivity of 0.1pu), phase-to-phase-to-ground 
faults cover a wider area of the 44kV network compared to phase-to-phase faults for the same dip 
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Figure 4.10: Dip influence zones for phase-to-phase-to-ground faults – paper plant 
 
4.2.3.4 Three-phase Faults 
 
Dip influence zones for three-phase faults are shown in figure 4.11. Failure of substation power 
plant often results in the most severe dips (three-phase faults) or interruptions. Power plant 
equipment prone to failure is installed at some of the substations enclosed by Zone B (3-ph). The 
resultant voltage dips at the monitored site will be more severe than 0.5pu. In the network 
development report compiled by Viljoen et al [24], the following catastrophic plant failures are 
reported to have occurred: 
 Weight-operated isolators at Modder East substation failed frequently on mechanical fatigue 
(isolator technology relying on mechanical weights to open or close; latest technology is based 
on electrical motor mechanism). 
 Contacts for bulk oil circuit breakers at Delmas DS often fail to open for faults in the correct 
zone of protection (bulk oil circuit breakers represent earliest switching technology based on 







































































Dip Sensitivity @ Monitored Site
Dip magnitude = 0.1 pu
Dip magnitude = 0.5 pu
Dip magnitude = 0.7 pu
 
 - 96 -
 Transformer bushings (Benoni DS 132/44kV transformers) have catastrophically failed 



































The dip influence zones are important graphical tools to assess the severity of dips on the site of 
interest.  
 
For the steel plant, phase-to-phase faults on any part of the 88kV network cause dips more 
severe than 0.3pu at the monitored site. Zone A (ph-ph), representing a voltage sensitivity of 
0.5pu, encloses the Union DS/Jupiter 88kV lines and part of Germiston South/Tailings Booster 
88kV line. Germiston South/Tailings Booster and Union DS/Jupiter 88kV lines were identified as 
the worst-performing circuits in terms of dip performance. Zone B (1-ph), representing a voltage 
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core cables in flat formation). In the investigation conducted in [33], the average performance of 
these circuits was calculated to be two faults per circuit per annum in 2005. This performance 
statistic translates to an average of four dip events more severe than 0.4pu, per circuit per annum 
(each cable circuit is 2.15km in length).  
 
Phase-to-phase-to-ground faults on the 88kV network cause dips exceeding 0.7pu (Zone B (ph-
ph-g)) while phase-to-phase faults on the same network cause dips exceeding 0.3pu (Zone B (ph-
ph)) at the monitored site. Thus it would appear that the customer plant is more sensitive to 
phase-to-phase-to-ground faults compared with phase-to-phase faults. Three-phase faults on 
Union DS/Jupiter and Germiston South/Tailings Booster 88kV lines cause dips worse than 0.7pu 
at the monitored site (Zone B (3-ph)). These two lines were identified as the circuits where the 
largest number of faults occurred.  
 
For the paper plant, phase-to-phase faults on the 44kV network have a moderate impact on the 
customer’s plant (for a large area of the 44kV network, dip sensitivity is 0.3pu). Zone A (1-ph), 
representing a dip sensitivity of 0.7pu, covers part of the 132kV network. Numerous single-phase 
faults were experienced on the 132kV network due to industrial pollution (SAPPI and Enstra 
substations) and conductor theft (Benoni DS/Nevis 1 and SAPPI/TEE 132kV lines). Zone B (3-ph) 
and Zone B (ph-ph-g), both with dip sensitivities of 0.5pu, enclose the entire 132kV network. 
Catastrophic plant failures (three-phase faults) have occurred at certain substations within the 
132kV network (Modder East, Delmas DS, Benoni DS) [24]. To improve dip performance at the 
monitored site, the following strategies may be considered: 
 Decreasing the frequency of faults by phasing out obsolete plant technology at Modder East, 
Delmas DS, Benoni DS and other substations. 
 Eliminating or at least decreasing the frequency of faults due to conductor theft, storm-related, 
conductor-related and veld fire incidents, particularly on the Benoni DS/Nevis 1 and 
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CHAPTER 5: 
COMMUNICATION OF VOLTAGE DIP PERFORMANCE 
 
5.1      INTRODUCTION 
 
Regular interactions between Eskom and its industrial customers are necessary to find solutions 
to power quality problems. In these forums, discussions are centred around dip events recorded 
since the previous forum. The utility’s primary objective is to monitor dip performance so that the 
dip limits are not exceeded. The limitation of the existing dip performance communication 
practices are discussed in section 2.3.4. 
 
The proposed strategy is summarized in table 5.1. The key elements of the proposed dip 
performance communication strategy are briefly discussed below. Table 5.1 was generated in this 
study.  
 
5.2        DIP PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
Electrical faults can occur on the transmission networks, distribution networks or at the customer’s 
plant. Within Eskom, transmission and distribution networks are operated by independent 
business units (Transmission and Distribution). It is therefore necessary to analyse dip events 
according to ownership of the networks where dips occurred.  
 
Dip causes are determined by correlating dip data (time of occurrence) and circuit breaker trip 
data. Events with identical time stamps (in milliseconds) are considered to be correlated. For ease 
of analysis, dip causes are classified into a finite number of categories. In the event that the cause 
of a dip cannot be verified, the dip is assigned to the ‘unknown’ category. The number of dips in 
the ‘unknown’ category must be kept to a minimum, especially in cases where the dips have long 
durations or large magnitudes or both.  
 
To be able to respond to unsatisfactory dip performance, the location of faults affecting the 
customer, must be known. When used in conjunction with dip causes and dip types, the 
identification of critical circuits enables both the utility and customer to formulate appropriate 
solutions to specific dip performance problems. 
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A disturbance such as a voltage dip event can cause customer plant to malfunction or shut down 
after which a time-dependent restart procedure is needed. The evaluation of dip-related financial 
losses gives the utility the appreciation of the impact of dips on industrial processes. 
 
5.3 VOLTAGE DIP SIMULATION  
 
The impact of dips can be quantified by modelling the supply network and simulating faults to 
compute fault positions for pre-defined dip sensitivities at the monitored site. The end result of the 
dip simulation exercise is a set of dip influence zones for various fault types. The calculation of dip 
influence zones is particularly important to both the customer and the utility. The utility can use dip 
influence zones to direct maintenance and refurbishment initiatives to specific parts of the network 
to improve dip performance for a specific site. Dip influence zones may also be used as a tool to 
encourage customers to increase their plant dip immunity levels for faults on remote networks. 
The additional benefit of defining dip influence zones is that clear responsibilities can be assigned 
between the customer and the utility, in respect of dip performance. For example, the utility may 
be required to limit the frequency of faults on networks close to the customer, while the customer 
may be required to increase plant immunity levels for faults on remote networks.  
 
5.4 FEEDBACK FROM CUSTOMERS 
 
The proposed approach (summarized in table 5.1) was adopted in communicating dip 
performance to industrial customers. The QOS interaction forum of the 10th August 2006 was 
based on this new approach. This new approach is considered to be the optimal communication 
strategy for dip performance and has been received with enthusiasm by industrial customers 
consulted. 
 
Annexure F is an incomplete example of the proposed approach to the management of dip 
performance presented to the pulp and paper customer (dip influence zones were still under 
development at the time of presentation). The author of this thesis performed the analysis (using 
Excel, Event Viewer, NEPS and TIPPS) that was presented in [34]. Reference [35] is a complete 
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Table 5.1: Elements of the proposed dip performance communication strategy 
Element Description 
Platform to discuss dip 
performance 
1. Regular customer interaction forums. 
2. Ad hoc meetings in response to specific customer request. 
Key objectives of 
interactions 
1. Collaborate with customers to ensure mutual responsibility of dip performance. 
2. Provide sufficiently detailed information to enable investment decisions on 
QOS improvement projects. 
Points of discussion 
1. Comprehensive analysis of recorded dip events: 
a. Ownership of network where dips occurred. 
b. Causes of dips (dip-to-trip matching). 
c. Circuits that affect dip performance of the customer’s plant most 
severely. 
d. Types of dips per contributing circuit. 
e. Financial impact of voltage dips on the customer. 
2. Dip modelling 
a. Identifying network areas in which faults may affect dip 
performance at the examined site. 
b. Simulating electrical faults and resultant dips at the monitored site. 
c. Calculating dip sensitivity zones for all fault types. 
d. Comparison of simulated dip impact (remaining voltage at 
monitored site) with actual recorded dip events. 
3. Progress on QOS initiatives identified during previous interactions. 
Basis of interaction 
1. Joint effort to manage dip performance according to known factors (industrial 
pollution, conductor theft, age of plant). 
Customer participation 
1. Demonstrating how dip immunity levels of plant will be increased for faults on 
remote networks. 
2. Track production downtime losses as a direct result of dips. 
3. Share feedback on customer’s own initiative to improve dip performance. 
4. Influencing progress of the utility’s initiatives to improve dip performance.  
Review of dip 
simulations 
1. Dip influence zones are to be reviewed in the event of major changes in the 
configuration of the network (new substation connected, network supplied from 
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This study examined the following key research question: How can communication of dip 
performance be optimized, with a view to ensuring mutual technical responsibility of plant, 
between the utility and the customer? The scope of the study included dip analysis for the 
selected industrial plants, network modelling, calculation of dip influence zones and presentation 
of results to customers concerned. To investigate the key research question the following 
process, outlined in Section 1.8, was followed: 
 Conducting a literature review. 
 Analysing dip performance for industrial plants from both the customer and utility perspective. 
 Modelling and simulation of networks supplying the industrial plants and calculation of dip 
influence zones for each plant. 
 Presentation of results to the industrial customers. 
 
6.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Several definitions of voltage dips exist in literature, differing only in the specification of magnitude 
and duration thresholds. Industrial processes are sensitive not only to dip magnitude and duration, 
but also to phase-angle jump and point-on-wave characteristics.  
 
Voltage dips are caused by short-duration overcurrents flowing through the power system. The 
principal contributions to overcurrents are motor starting, transformer energizing and power 
system faults. Electrical motors are three-phase balanced loads, and the associated voltage 
drops, during start-up, are the same in all phases. The energizing of a large transformer gives rise 
to voltage dips characterized by a sudden drop in voltage and a slow recovery. Power system 
faults are the most frequent cause of dips, single-phase short-circuits in particular.  
 
The causes of faults can be grouped into a finite number of categories. Lightning-related faults 
may arise as a consequence of direct lightning strikes, indirect lightning strikes and back-
flashover from shield wire or steel tower. Bird-initiated faults arise due to bird electrocutions, bird 
streamers and insulator pollution as a result of bird droppings. In addition, insulator pollution, 
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hardware failures, veld fires, cane fires and vegetation-induced faults also have a profound 
influence on the performance of electrical networks.  
 
Various methods of extracting useful information from dip records have been investigated in 
literature. The IEC dip characterization method defines dip magnitude as the maximum r.m.s. 
excursion from the declared voltage. The dip duration is defined as the instant when the r.m.s. 
voltage on one phase falls below the dip threshold to the instant when all three phases are again 
above the dip threshold. The limitation of the IEC method is that a voltage drop in a single phase 
is characterized as equally severe as a voltage drop in all three phases. 
 
The ABC method distinguishes between seven types of dip events by analysing possible types of 
short-circuits, the dip propagation through transformers and connection of measuring instruments. 
The ABC method assumes that sequence impedances are equal, and this is the limitation of this 
method. The symmetrical dip characterization method distinguishes between dip events with the 
main voltage drop in one phase and dip events with the main voltage drop in multiple phases. To 
characterize the dip event, the symmetrical method defines two parameters: the positive-negative 
factor and the characteristic voltage. 
 
The South African dip characterization method has evolved over many years from the ABCD dip 
window to the STXYZ dip window currently in use. The dip window is a two-dimensional plot of dip 
magnitude and dip duration as a function of customer equipment dip immunity levels and speed of 
protection systems. 
 
Voltage dip performance is not a standard specification on industrial equipment. Customers are 
therefore, largely unaware of the potential dip sensitivity problems when designing new plants or 
extending existing ones. Voltage dips can cause tripping of computers and process-control 
equipment. Motor contactors can drop out due to lack of voltage required by the magnetic coils to 
keep the contactors connected. Variable speed drives may trip due to operation of undervoltage 
protection and overcurrent protection. Voltage dips may cause certain types of lamps to 
extinguish completely or partially. 
 
Various approaches are available to mitigate voltage dip problems: power system grid, system-
equipment interface and process improvement solutions. The frequency and severity of dips may 
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be reduced by reconfiguring the power system grid. Examples of system reconfiguration include 
splitting of busbars, improving fault clearing time, installing current limiting reactors and others. 
The frequency of short-circuits can be reduced by installing bird guards, maintaining line 
servitudes and installing line arresters. Most of the dip mitigation techniques used at the system-
equipment interface are based on the injection of power to compensate for the loss of active 
power during a dip event. Motor-generator sets, static shunt compensators and uninterruptible 
power supplies are some of many energy storage devices that can be installed at the PCC. 
Process modification options are concerned with improving the ride-through capability of process 
equipment. Variable speed drives can be equipped with automatic restart. For installations where 
a d.c. supply is available, replacement of a.c. contactors with d.c. contactors can be considered.  
 
Two methods are generally used for modelling of voltage dips, namely, the method of fault 
positions and the method of critical distances. The method of fault positions is used to calculate 
the magnitude and duration of voltage dips at the monitored site for a number of faults spread 
throughout the power system. The method of critical distances calculates fault positions 
(distances from the monitored site) for a given dip sensitivity (magnitude or duration or both) at 
the monitored site. Voltage dip sensitivity zones are derived from a plot of fault distances (for a set 
of fault parameters) on the power system. 
 
In the South African context, the initial regulatory framework defined compatibility levels for 
voltage dips in the form of a maximum number of voltage dips per year for each voltage dip type. 
South African utilities have experienced difficulty in complying with the dip limits specified by 
NERSA. Eskom holds regular customer interaction forums with the intention to discuss and solve 
dip problems and other power quality issues. The primary objective of these interactions is to 
demonstrate dip performance against dip limits. The new regulatory framework was developed in 
response to the difficulty of managing voltage dip performance based on limits. 
 
6.3 VOLTAGE DIP PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
It is a regulatory requirement for the utilities to install power quality measuring instruments at 
sufficient locations in their electrical networks to adequately measure and report performance. 
Eskom’s measured dip data is stored in a central database. For both the steel plant and the paper 
plant, the dip data was analysed by considering the ownership of the networks, causes of dips, 
dip classes and costs associated with dip events.   
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For the steel plant, a presentation of dip events according to ownership of the network, revealed 
that a large number of T-class dips occurred on the distribution networks. This observation can be 
attributed to faults clearing via back-up protection, in case of failure of the main protection 
systems. A breakdown of fault causes showed that storm-related faults, equipment failures, 
conductor-related faults and conductor theft incidents form the largest contribution to dip 
performance of the monitored site.  
 
The largest number of electrical faults occurred on the Germiston South/Tailings Booster and 
Union DS/Jupiter 88kV overhead lines. Long-duration dip events (T-class, Z1-class, Z2-class and 
S-class) occurred predominantly on Germiston South/Tailings Booster, Union DS/Jupiter and 
Germiston South/SAR Rooikop 88kV lines. The plant audit conducted by the author on the Union 
DS 88kV network, revealed that the protection system is outdated and prone to failure while 
product support has also ceased to exist [25], [26]. The relay-based protection technology has, 
over the years, evolved from phase-1 relays (electromagnetic relay technology) to phase-4 relays 
(digital programmable relay technology). On the other hand, the original phase-1 relays installed 
at Union DS, Germiston South and Mill Scaw substations, have been in operation for a period 
exceeding 30 years. Consultations with representatives of the steel plant revealed that dip-related 
costs would only be crude estimates and consequently dip cost analysis was not performed for 
this plant. 
 
For the pulp and paper plant, long-duration dip events (T-class and Z2-class) experienced at the 
monitored site, originated from the distribution networks. A distribution of dip causes showed that 
conductor theft incidents, conductor-related faults, storm-related faults and veld fires contributed 
significantly to dip performance of the monitored site. Electrical faults occurred predominantly on 
Benoni/Nevis 1 and SAPPI/Tee 1 132kV overhead lines. Long-duration dip events (Z2-class and 
T-class) occurred predominantly on Benoni/Nevis 1 132kV line and SAPPI/Tee 132kV line. 
 
Faults on the Benoni/Nevis 1 132kV line (mainly conductor theft) and SAPPI substation resulted in 
the highest financial losses (exceeding R800,000 in 2003). Possibility exists that the customer 
may over-estimate dip-related downtime costs in an attempt to accelerate maintenance efforts on 
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6.4 VOLTAGE DIP SIMULATION 
 
Voltage dip influence zones are important graphical tools to assess the impact of dips on the 
examined site.  
 
For the steel plant, phase-to-phase faults on any part of the 88kV network cause dips more 
severe than 0.3pu at the monitored site. Zone A (ph-ph), representing a voltage sensitivity of 
0.5pu, encloses the Union DS/Jupiter 88kV lines and part of Germiston South/Tailings Booster 
88kV line. Germiston South/Tailings Booster and Union DS/Jupiter 88kV lines were identified as 
the worst-performing circuits in terms of dip performance. Zone B (1-ph), representing a voltage 
sensitivity of 0.4pu, encloses Germiston/Simmerpan 88kV circuits (underground oil-filled single-
core cables in flat formation). In the investigation report conducted in [33], the average 
performance of these circuits was calculated to be two faults per circuit per annum in 2005. This 
performance statistic translates to an average of four dip events (minimum depth of 0.4pu) per 
circuit per annum (each cable circuit is 2.15km in length). Three-phase faults on Union DS/Jupiter 
and Germiston South/Tailings Booster 88kV lines cause dips worse than 0.7pu at the monitored 
site (Zone B (3-ph)). These two lines were identified as the circuits where the largest number of 
dips occurred.  
 
For the paper plant, phase-to-phase faults on the 44kV network have a moderate impact on the 
customer’s plant (for a large area of the 44kV network, dip sensitivity is 0.3pu). Zone A (1-ph), 
representing a dip sensitivity of 0.7pu, covers part of the 132kV network. Numerous single-phase 
faults were experienced on the 132kV network due to industrial pollution (SAPPI and Enstra 
substations) and conductor theft (Benoni DS/Nevis 1 and SAPPI/TEE 132kV lines). Zone B (3-ph) 
and Zone B (ph-ph-g), both with dip sensitivities of 0.5pu, enclose the entire 132kV network. 
Catastrophic plant failures (three-phase faults) have occurred at certain substations within the 
132kV network (Modder East, Delmas DS, Benoni DS) [24].  
 
6.5 REVIEW OF STUDY OBJECTIVES 
 
The objectives of the research study were stated as follows: 
 To quantify voltage dip performance for the selected industrial plants. 
 To define voltage dip sensitivity zones for the selected plants. 




 - 106 -
A literature review was conducted to develop the conceptual framework for the study. Voltage dip 
concepts such as phase-angle jump, dip characterization, dip causes, effects of dips and 
mitigation techniques were reviewed.  
 
A dip analysis study was conducted to extract useful dip information from recorded data. The dip 
data was analysed in conjunction with circuit breaker trip data available in Eskom’s network 
performance systems. The results of the analysis enable the utility to conduct detailed 
investigations on the following issues: 
 Possible solutions to reduce the number of conductor-related faults on the Germiston 
South/Tailings Booster 88kV line. 
 Possible solutions to eliminate or at least reduce the number of conductor theft incidents on 
the Union DS/Jupiter 88kV lines, Germiston South/Tailings Booster 88kV line and Benoni 
DS/Nevis 132kV lines. 
  Feasible options to improve the speed of fault-clearing for faults on the Benoni/Nevis 1 132kV 
line, SAPPI/Tee 132kV line, Germiston South/Tailings Booster 88kV line, Union DS/Jupiter 
88kV line and Germiston South/SAR Rooikop 88kV line. 
 Plans to phase out obsolete plant technology at Modder East substation (weight-operated 
isolators) and Benoni DS (bulk oil circuit breakers). 
 
The analysis results also make it possible for the customer to critically review financial losses due 
to voltage dips: 
 The pulp and paper customer lost in excess of eight hundred thousand rands in 2003. 
Therefore an opportunity exists to invest in energy storage devices (compensators, 
ferroresonant transformers etc) or process equipment to improve dip performance of the plant. 
 Financial losses due to dips are estimated and tracked by the customer. It is not clear how the 
overall cost estimation is derived. Therefore a need exists to conduct a comprehensive study 
on the estimation of production losses due to voltage dips. 
 
The dip analysis identified critical circuits, verified causes of faults and made it possible for both 
the utility and the customer to discuss possible options to improve dip performance. 
 
The models of networks supplying the selected industrial plants were successfully created in 
DIgSILENT PowerFactory. Different types of faults were then simulated in the power system to 
evaluate the impact at the monitored sites. The results of the simulations were used to define dip 
 
 - 107 -
influence zones for each industrial plant. The calculation of dip influence zones allows the utility 
and its customers to hold discussions on the following issues: 
 Plans to reduce the frequency of faults on the network closest to the customer’s point of 
supply. Zone B (3-ph) for the paper plant, encloses the entire 132kV network. Faults on the 
132kV network are expected to cause dips exceeding 0.5pu at the monitored site.  
 Plans to increase equipment dip immunity levels for faults on remote networks. For the steel 
plant, single-phase faults on the Simmerpan/Germiston Munic 88kV circuits (underground oil-
filled cables) occur frequently and take long to restore. The dip sensitivity for faults on these 
circuits is 0.4pu, at the monitored site (Zone A (1-ph)). 
 
The dip influence zones allow the utility and the customers to quantify the dip impact at the site of 
interest, as a result of faults at various parts of the supply system. 
 
The alternative approach to dip performance communication was successfully developed. The 
proposed approach is presented in table 5.1 (section 5.4) and table 2.5 (section 2.3.5). The 
implication is that a much more comprehensive analysis of dips needs to be conducted by power 
quality engineers compared to the current practice. The proposed strategy in communicating dip 
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ANNEXURE A: 
STEEL PLANT DIP RECORDS (2003 – 2005) 
 
 
Depth Block Duration Block DIP_DT PHASES New Class Group CIRCUIT CAUSE 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2003/01/05 18:31 R Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/01/05 18:31 RW Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/01/09 02:13 RWB Z1 Distribution SOUTH WEST VERTICAL 44/6.6/3.3KV SUBSTATION Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/01/09 03:35 WB Z1 Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2003/01/15 21:55 W Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D2(30-<40%) T1(0-<50ms) 2003/01/15 21:55 W X1 Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2003/01/17 19:46 RWB T Transmission Jupiter No4 275kV Shunt Cap Bay 
Equipment 
Failure 
D2(30-<40%) T3(70-<100ms) 2003/02/14 14:37 B X1 Transmission Esselen No6 275kV - 132kV - 22kV Trfr Bay Human Related 
D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2003/02/14 17:19 R T Distribution GERMISTON SOUTH / SAR ROOIKOP 1 88kV BKR Veld Fire 
D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2003/03/23 18:22 RW X1 Distribution 
SOUTH WEST VERTICAL TRFR 2AB 44/3.3kV TRFR 
BAY Storm Related 
D3(40-<60%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/03/23 18:32 RWB Z2 Distribution 
SOUTH WEST VERTICAL TRFR 2AB 44/3.3kV TRFR 
BAY Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/03/23 19:00 B Y Unknown UNION DS TRFR 2 88kV BKR 
Protection 
Failure 
D3(40-<60%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/03/23 19:20 RWB Z2 Customer MILL SCAW TRFR 4 88/6.6kV TRFR Bay 
Customer 
Related 
D4(60-100%) T3(70-<100ms) 2003/04/05 21:24 B T Distribution JACK SHAFT TRFR 1 88/6.6kV TRFR 
Equipment 
Failure 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/04/18 03:23 RWB Z1 Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/05/02 12:03 RWB Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/05/02 12:03 RW Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2003/05/02 12:03 R Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/05/02 12:03 RW Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/06/09 14:33 RWB Z1 Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/07/30 08:29 RWB Z1 Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/08/11 11:48 RWB Y Customer Prospect-Kelvin 3 
Customer 
Related 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/08/11 11:48 RWB Z1 Customer Prospect-Kelvin 3 
Customer 
Related 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/08/11 11:48 RWB Z1 Customer Prospect-Kelvin 3 
Customer 
Related 
D2(30-<40%) T3(70-<100ms) 2003/08/12 08:39 RW X1 Distribution 
SIMMER & JACK / SOUTH WEST VERTICAL 1 44kV HV 
Overhead Line Cable Fault 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2003/09/19 01:26 W Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/10/06 12:57 RWB S Customer 
GERMISTON MUNIC / EKURHULENI METRO - MP1 
33KV Bulk Load  
Equipment 
Failure 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/10/17 05:07 RWB Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D3(40-<60%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/10/19 12:40 RWB S Distribution UNION DS TRFR 2 88/44kV TRFR 
Equipment 
Failure 
D2(30-<40%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/10/25 11:39 B S Customer UNION DS / SAR KATLEGONG - AERO TEE 1 88kV BKR 
Customer 
Related 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2003/11/14 08:25 W Y Distribution 
SOUTH WEST VERTICAL / SIMMER & JACK 1 44kV 
BKR Cable Fault 
D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2003/11/15 16:26 RWB T Distribution UNION DS / JUPITER 1 88kV BKR Storm Related 
D4(60-100%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/01/03 14:53 B T Distribution GERMISTON SOUTH / SAR ROOIKOP 1 88kV BKR 
Conductor 
Related 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2004/01/03 20:51 RWB S Customer MILL SCAW TRFR 1 88kV TRFR Bay 
Customer 
Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/01/04 22:13 RWB Y Distribution NORTH RAND D.S. 132/44KV SUBSTATION Storm Related 
D3(40-<60%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/01/11 17:55 RB X2 Transmission Eiger Fordsburg No1 275kV Line Storm Related 
D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/01/15 20:09 R T Distribution UNION DS / SAR KATLEHONG 1 88kV BKR Storm Related 
D4(60-100%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/01/19 12:20 W T Distribution 




D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/02/03 11:26 B Y Customer UNION DS / SAR KATLEHONG 1 88kV BKR 
Customer 
Related 
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D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/02/24 17:08 RW X1 Distribution SCAW METALS TRFR 1AB 44kV BKR Pollution 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2004/02/25 15:46 R T Distribution GERMISTON SOUTH / MILL SCAW 1 88kV BKR 
Conductor 
Related 
D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/02/26 08:52 RWB X1 Customer GERMISTON SOUTH 88/33KV SUBSTATION Cable Fault 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2004/03/05 23:16 R Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/03/05 23:16 RWB Z1 Customer GERMISTON MUNIC TRFR 2 88/33kV TRFR Cable Fault 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/03/23 17:47 WB Y Customer MILL SCAW TRFR 4 88/6.6kV TRFR Bay 
Customer 
Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/04/05 23:26 W Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/04/20 05:11 RWB Z1 Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/05/25 16:38 W Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/06/08 08:37 RWB Z1 Distribution MILL SCAW TRFR 2 88kV BKR Human Related 
D2(30-<40%) T2(50-<70ms) 2004/06/17 13:47 RW X1 Transmission Eiger Etna No1 275kV Line Veld Fire 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2004/06/22 03:13 R Y Distribution UNION DS / JUPITER 1 88kV BKR Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/06/22 04:26 R Y Distribution UNION DS / JUPITER 1 88kV BKR Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2004/06/28 13:36 B Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/07/26 16:40 W T Distribution 




D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/07/26 16:40 W T Distribution 




D2(30-<40%) T1(0-<50ms) 2004/08/08 20:31 W X1 Transmission Eiger Etna No1 275kV Line Bird Related 
D2(30-<40%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/08/09 10:18 RWB Z2 Customer UNION DS / CONSOL GLASS 2 44kV BKR 
Customer 
Related 
D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/08/09 16:39 RW T Distribution GERMISTON SOUTH / SAR ROOIKOP 1 88kV BKR Veld Fire 
D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/08/09 16:39 RW T Distribution GERMISTON SOUTH / SAR ROOIKOP 1 88kV BKR Veld Fire 
D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/08/14 20:03 W T Distribution 
GERMISTON SOUTH / TAILINGS BOOSTER 1 88kV HV 
Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/08/14 20:03 W T Distribution 
GERMISTON SOUTH / TAILINGS BOOSTER 1 88kV HV 
Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/08/14 20:05 W T Distribution 
GERMISTON SOUTH / TAILINGS BOOSTER 1 88kV HV 
Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/08/31 13:43 R X1 Transmission Esselen Jupiter No1 275kV Line Trees 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2004/09/01 13:48 W Y Distribution UNION DS TRFR 1 88kV BKR 
Protection 
Failure 
D3(40-<60%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/09/16 10:36 B X2 Distribution SAR KATLEHONG / UNION 1 88kV HV Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/09/25 13:36 B T Distribution 




D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/09/25 13:39 B T Distribution 




D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/09/25 13:44 B T Distribution 




D3(40-<60%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/10/06 22:21 W X2 Transmission Fordsburg Jupiter No1 275kV Line Other 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/10/12 17:09 RWB Y Distribution UNION DS / MILL SCAW 1 88kV BKR Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2004/10/25 17:17 B Y Distribution UNION DS / SAR KATLEGONG - AERO TEE 1 88kV BKR Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2004/10/25 17:17 B Y Distribution UNION DS / SAR KATLEGONG - AERO TEE 1 88kV BKR Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/10/25 17:17 WB Z1 Distribution 
GERMISTON FACTORIES / HERCULES SHAFT 1 44kV 
HV Overhead Line Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/10/28 00:44 R X1 Distribution 
GERMISTON FACTORIES / SOUTH WEST VERTICAL 3 
44kV BKR Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/10/28 00:46 R X1 Distribution 
GERMISTON FACTORIES / SOUTH WEST VERTICAL 3 
44kV BKR Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/11/08 17:16 RB Z1 Distribution HERCULES SHAFT / CASON MILL 1 44kV BKR Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2004/12/01 05:10 WB Y Distribution MILL SCAW TRFR 2 88/6.6kV TRFR Bay Human Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/12/19 16:08 R Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2005/01/03 22:57 B Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D4(60-100%) T2(50-<70ms) 2005/01/06 09:35 RWB T Distribution ROSHSTEP TRFR 3 88/6.6kV Two Winding Transformer 
Equipment 
Failure 
D2(30-<40%) T2(50-<70ms) 2005/01/08 21:57 WB X1 Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2005/01/15 04:55 W Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/01/29 08:25 B Y Distribution GERMISTON SOUTH / MILL SCAW 1 88kV BKR Conductor Theft 
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D3(40-<60%) T6(600ms-3s) 2005/02/06 11:15 RWB Z2 Distribution UNION DS / GERMISTON SOUTH 1 88kV BKR Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2005/02/17 09:27 B Y Distribution UNION DS / MILL SCAW 1 88kV BKR 
Protection 
Failure 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/02/24 21:48 W Y Distribution UNION DS / JUPITER 2 88kV BKR Trees 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/02/27 20:56 B Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2005/03/13 09:56 W Y Distribution MILL SCAW / UNION DS 88KV LINE 
Equipment 
Failure 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2005/03/13 09:56 W Y Distribution MILL SCAW / UNION DS 88KV LINE 
Equipment 
Failure 
D4(60-100%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/03/14 21:48 RWB T Distribution ROSHSTEP TRFR 2 88/22kV Two Winding Transformer Storm Related 
D3(40-<60%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/03/15 14:54 WB X2 Distribution UNION DS / JUPITER 1 88kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D3(40-<60%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/03/15 14:54 RWB X2 Distribution UNION DS / JUPITER 1 88kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D3(40-<60%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/03/15 14:54 B X2 Distribution UNION DS / JUPITER 1 88kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/03/15 14:54 RWB T Distribution UNION DS / JUPITER 1 88kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/03/15 14:55 B Y Distribution UNION DS / GERMISTON SOUTH 1 88kV BKR Bird Related 
D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/04/10 09:04 W T Distribution UNION DS / JUPITER 2 88kV BKR Trees 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/04/28 21:04 W Y Distribution MILL SCAW TRFR 2 88kV BKR 
Equipment 
Failure 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/05/12 14:49 R Y Distribution UNION DS TRFR 1 88kV BKR 
Equipment 
Failure 
D2(30-<40%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/05/16 23:01 R X1 Transmission Brenner Eiger No1 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2005/05/17 21:07 R Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D2(30-<40%) T5(150-<600ms) 2005/05/27 02:26 W S Distribution UNION DS 88/44KV SUBSTATION 
Equipment 
Failure 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2005/05/31 12:59 RWB S Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/06/16 16:37 RW Y Distribution UNION DS / EIGER 88KV LINE Veld Fire 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/06/16 16:37 WB Y Distribution UNION DS / EIGER 88KV LINE Veld Fire 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2005/06/16 16:37 WB Y Distribution UNION DS / EIGER 88KV LINE Veld Fire 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/06/16 16:37 RWB Y Distribution UNION DS / EIGER 88KV LINE Veld Fire 
D2(30-<40%) T2(50-<70ms) 2005/06/20 03:22 R X1 Transmission Brenner Eiger No1 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2005/07/21 08:28 RW Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D2(30-<40%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/07/25 15:58 B X1 Transmission Esselen Jupiter No1 275kV Line Veld Fire 
D2(30-<40%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/07/25 15:58 B X1 Transmission Esselen Jupiter No1 275kV Line Veld Fire 
D2(30-<40%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/08/11 11:36 RWB X1 Distribution UNION DS / JUPITER 1 88kV BKR 
Equipment 
Failure 
D2(30-<40%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/08/14 11:15 B X1 Transmission Esselen Jupiter No1 275kV Line Veld Fire 
D2(30-<40%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/08/14 11:15 B X1 Transmission Esselen Jupiter No1 275kV Line Veld Fire 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2005/08/17 10:14 B Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/09/03 16:51 W Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/09/22 11:37 RW Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2005/09/26 04:30 RWB Y Distribution GERMISTON SOUTH / SAR ROOIKOP 1 88kV BKR Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/09/26 04:35 RB Y Distribution GERMISTON SOUTH / SAR ROOIKOP 1 88kV BKR Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T6(600ms-3s) 2005/09/28 05:17 RWB Z2 Distribution UNION DS TRFR 2 44kV BKR 
Equipment 
Failure 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2005/10/03 16:28 R T Distribution UNION DS / MILL SCAW 1 88kV BKR 
Equipment 
Failure 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2005/10/16 09:26 B Y Distribution GERMISTON SOUTH / MILL SCAW 1 88kV BKR Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/10/16 09:30 B Y Distribution GERMISTON SOUTH / MILL SCAW 1 88kV BKR Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2005/11/04 18:01 WB Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D4(60-100%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/11/25 17:52 B T Unknown Unknown Unknown 
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ANNEXURE B: 
PULP & PAPER PLANT DIP RECORDS (2003 – 2005) 
 
 
Depth Block Duration Block DIP_DT PHASES New Class Group Circuit Cause 
D2(30-<40%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/01/06 01:15 WB S Distribution BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2003/01/06 01:15 WB Y Distribution BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/01/06 05:23 W Y Distribution BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2003/01/17 20:00 RWB Y Transmission Nevis Pieterboth No1 275kV Line Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2003/01/20 00:09 W Y Distribution DELMAS DS / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/01/20 00:09 R Y Distribution DELMAS DS / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/01/20 14:10 RWB T Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Storm Related 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/01/21 17:01 RWB T Distribution BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2003/02/16 14:39 W Y Transmission Nevis Snowdon No2 275kV Line Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2003/03/12 09:53 W Y Transmission Atlas Highveld No3 275kV Line Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2003/03/14 20:38 WB Y Transmission Nevis Snowdon No2 275kV Line Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/03/14 22:49 RWB S Distribution BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/03/14 22:49 RWB Z2 Distribution BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2003/03/19 18:03 RWB Y Transmission Atlas Snowdon No1 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2003/03/22 03:11 W Y Transmission Atlas Snowdon No1 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2003/03/25 02:11 W Y Transmission Atlas Snowdon No1 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2003/03/27 01:18 W Y Transmission Atlas Snowdon No1 275kV Line Bird Related 
D4(60-100%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/04/07 16:42 RWB Z2 Distribution SAPPI / TEE 1 132kV CONDUCTOR Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/07 16:42 RWB T Distribution SAPPI / TEE 1 132kV CONDUCTOR Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/04/07 19:22 RWB Z2 Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2003/04/08 05:34 WB Y Transmission Duvha Vulcan No1 400kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/11 02:47 RWB Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2003/04/14 14:30 W Y Transmission Atlas Everest No1 275kV Fdr Bay 
Equipment 
Failure 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/04/18 03:32 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:32 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/04/18 03:32 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/04/18 03:32 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:32 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:32 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:32 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:32 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:32 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:32 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:32 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:32 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:32 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 
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D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/18 03:33 RWB Y Transmission 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/04/22 20:52 RWB S Distribution SAPPI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR 
Conductor 
Related 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/05/08 14:22 W Y Distribution 
STRUBEN DS / GROOTVLEI 
SHAFT 1 44kV BKR Veld Fire 
D2(30-<40%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/05/13 23:31 RWB S Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/05/13 23:31 RWB Z2 Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2003/05/29 02:26 RWB X1 Transmission Matla Nevis No2 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2003/05/30 01:07 W Y Transmission Pieterboth Snowdon No1 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2003/05/30 20:13 WB Y Distribution Nevis Snowdon No2 275kV Line Bird Related 
D4(60-100%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/06/05 15:54 RWB Z2 Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Veld Fire 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/06/14 06:31 RWB T Distribution Sappi- Enstra 132kV line Bird Related 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/06/23 21:17 RWB T Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/06/24 21:35 RWB T Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/06/24 21:35 RWB S Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D2(30-<40%) T3(70-<100ms) 2003/06/24 21:35 RWB X1 Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/06/25 18:14 RWB T Customer 
ENSTRA / METER PANEL 1 6.6kV 
BKR Other 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/07/01 23:23 RWB T Distribution 
BENONI / ENSTRA 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/07/01 23:23 RWB T Distribution 
BENONI / ENSTRA 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2003/07/05 19:14 RB Y Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV 
CONDUCTOR Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/07/05 22:07 RWB T Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV 
CONDUCTOR Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2003/07/05 22:07 WB Y Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV 
CONDUCTOR Conductor Theft 
D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2003/07/05 22:07 RWB X1 Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV 
CONDUCTOR Conductor Theft 
D2(30-<40%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/07/13 22:11 RWB S Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/07/13 22:12 RWB T Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2003/07/14 13:33 WB Y Customer Unknown Unknown 
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D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/07/23 21:27 RWB Y Distribution 
SAR SUNDRA / STRUBEN 1 44kV 
HV Overhead Line (TSA - 
GERMISTON) Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/08/05 18:30 RWB T Distribution NEVIS / SAPPI 1 132kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/08/05 18:30 RWB T Distribution NEVIS / SAPPI 1 132kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/08/05 18:30 RWB S Distribution NEVIS / SAPPI 1 132kV BKR Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2003/08/06 06:19 R Y Distribution 
SAR SUNDRA / STRUBEN 1 44kV 
HV Overhead Line (TSA - 
GERMISTON) Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2003/09/09 22:22 WB Y Transmission Matla Atlas No1 400kV Line Veld Fire 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/09/24 05:57 RWB T Distribution SAPPI 132/6.6KV SUBSTATION Pollution 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/10/11 23:45 RWB T Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2003/10/19 04:04 RWB T Distribution SAPPI / TEE 1 132kV CONDUCTOR Storm Related 
D4(60-100%) T6(600ms-3s) 2003/10/19 04:05 RWB Z2 Distribution SAPPI / TEE 1 132kV CONDUCTOR Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T3(70-<100ms) 2003/11/18 19:22 RB X1 Distribution 
MODDER EAST / TEE 2 132kV 
CONDUCTOR Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2003/11/22 16:46 RWB Y Transmission Eiger Prospect No1 275kV Line Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2003/12/22 20:25 WB Y Distribution 
STRUBEN / WELGEDACHT TOWN 
1 44kV HV Overhead Line Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/01/03 07:37 RB Y Transmission 
Esselen Kruispunt - Matla No1 
275kV Line Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2004/01/03 12:13 RW S Distribution 




D2(30-<40%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/01/03 12:13 RWB Z2 Distribution 




D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/01/03 12:13 RWB Y Distribution 




D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2004/01/11 18:06 WB Y Distribution 
STRUBEN / WELGEDACHT TOWN 
1 44kV HV Overhead Line 
Conductor 
Related 
D2(30-<40%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/01/16 17:54 RWB Z2 Distribution 
STRUBEN DS / GROOTVLEI 
SHAFT 1 44kV BKR Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/01/16 17:54 RWB Z2 Distribution 
STRUBEN DS / GROOTVLEI 
SHAFT 1 44kV BKR Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/01/28 18:22 WB X1 Customer Benoni-Farramere 132kV cable Other 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/02/07 15:01 RWB Y Distribution 
WELGEDACHT TOWN / STRUBEN 
DS 1 44kV BKR Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/02/09 22:46 RB X1 Distribution Town-Morehill 132kV cable Conductor Theft 
D3(40-<60%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/02/13 19:46 RWB X2 Transmission Pieterboth Snowdon No1 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/02/19 16:50 RWB Y Transmission 
Camden 400kV Transfer BB Coupler 
B Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/03/01 18:01 RWB Y Transmission Atlas Snowdon No2 275kV Line Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2004/03/01 19:37 B Y Transmission Atlas Snowdon No2 275kV Line Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/03/07 13:45 RWB Z2 Distribution 
STRUBEN DS / SAR SUNDRA - 
HOLFONTEIN TEE 1 44kV BUSBAR 
ISOLATOR 1 Trees 
D3(40-<60%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/03/07 13:45 RWB Z2 Distribution 
STRUBEN DS / SAR SUNDRA - 
HOLFONTEIN TEE 1 44kV BUSBAR 
ISOLATOR 1 Trees 
D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/03/10 19:20 WB X1 Distribution BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2004/04/29 01:34 RW Y Transmission Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/05/01 17:19 RW Y Transmission Nevis Snowdon No2 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/05/09 00:58 RW Y Transmission Nevis Snowdon No2 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/05/17 02:32 RW Y Transmission Nevis Snowdon No2 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/05/17 03:08 RB Y Transmission Matla Nevis No1 275kV Line Bird Related 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2004/06/06 13:26 RWB T Distribution SAPPI / TEE 1 132kV CONDUCTOR 
Conductor 
Related 
D4(60-100%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/06/06 13:26 RWB T Distribution SAPPI / TEE 1 132kV CONDUCTOR 
Conductor 
Related 
D3(40-<60%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/06/11 13:44 RW X2 Distribution 
MODDER EAST / TEE 1 132kV 
CONDUCTOR Veld Fire 
D4(60-100%) T5(150-<600ms) 2004/06/12 13:09 RWB T Distribution SAPPI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR Veld Fire 
D4(60-100%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/06/12 13:09 RWB T Distribution SAPPI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR Veld Fire 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/06/19 17:11 RB Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D3(40-<60%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/06/27 06:39 RB X2 Distribution BENONI / ENSTRA 1 132kV BKR 
Conductor 
Related 
D4(60-100%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/07/24 13:16 RWB Z2 Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Veld Fire 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2004/08/13 00:49 B Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/08/13 00:49 RB Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/08/13 00:49 B Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/09/22 09:41 B Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D3(40-<60%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/10/07 13:39 RWB X2 Transmission Matla Nevis No1 275kV Line Veld Fire 
D3(40-<60%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/10/07 13:40 RWB X2 Transmission Matla Nevis No1 275kV Line Veld Fire 
D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/10/25 17:44 WB X1 Distribution 
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV 
Overhead Line Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2004/10/27 18:22 R Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2004/10/27 18:30 RB Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/10/27 18:30 R Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2004/10/27 18:31 RWB Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2004/11/05 16:52 B Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2004/11/05 16:52 B Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2004/11/06 13:49 WB Y Transmission Atlas Snowdon No1 275kV Line Storm Related 
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D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2004/11/15 19:31 WB Y Transmission Atlas Snowdon No1 275kV Line Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T2(50-<70ms) 2004/11/15 19:56 RWB X1 Transmission Atlas Snowdon No2 275kV Line Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/11/15 19:56 RWB X1 Transmission Atlas Snowdon No2 275kV Line Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T2(50-<70ms) 2004/11/15 20:11 RWB X1 Transmission Atlas Snowdon No2 275kV Line Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2004/11/18 19:14 WB X1 Distribution 




D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2004/11/28 18:50 RB Y Transmission Atlas Snowdon No2 275kV Line Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2004/11/28 19:40 RB Y Transmission Atlas Snowdon No2 275kV Line Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2005/01/03 20:02 RB Y Transmission Atlas Snowdon No2 275kV Line Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/01/08 20:24 RW Y Transmission Nevis Snowdon No2 275kV Line Storm Related 
D3(40-<60%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/01/08 20:25 RWB X2 Distribution 




D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2005/01/27 22:52 B Y Transmission Atlas Snowdon No1 275kV Line Storm Related 
D2(30-<40%) T6(600ms-3s) 2005/02/08 18:30 WB Z2 Distribution 




D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/02/08 19:00 WB X1 Distribution 




D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2005/02/11 17:50 B Y Distribution 
Nevis - Struben No1 & 2 132kV Line 
Trip and L/O Storm Related 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2005/02/18 05:45 RW Y Transmission Matla Komati No1 275kV Line Veld Fire 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2005/02/25 16:30 RB Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/03/02 17:08 WB X1 Distribution 




D3(40-<60%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/04/14 18:46 RB X2 Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/06/02 12:46 RB Y Transmission Nevis Pieterboth No1 275kV Line Veld Fire 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/06/02 12:46 RB Y Transmission Nevis Pieterboth No1 275kV Line Veld Fire 
D1(0-<30%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/06/07 05:44 WB Y Transmission Matla Nevis No2 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T2(50-<70ms) 2005/06/12 13:33 W Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/06/29 04:32 RW Y Transmission Pieterboth Snowdon No1 275kV Line Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/06/29 05:48 RW Y Transmission Pieterboth Snowdon No1 275kV Line Conductor Theft 
D1(0-<30%) T1(0-<50ms) 2005/07/03 05:09 RW Y Transmission Matla Glockner No2 400kV Fdr Bay Other 
D3(40-<60%) T5(150-<600ms) 2005/07/21 08:28 RWB S Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/08/14 15:25 B Y Transmission Nevis Snowdon No2 275kV Line Veld Fire 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/08/20 05:58 RW Y Transmission Pieterboth Snowdon No1 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/08/20 07:14 RW Y Transmission Pieterboth Snowdon No1 275kV Line Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/09/13 12:37 RB Y Transmission Matla Nevis No2 275kV Line Veld Fire 
D1(0-<30%) T5(150-<600ms) 2005/09/27 03:15 R Y Distribution ENSTRA / SAPPI 1 132KV BKR Bird Related 
D1(0-<30%) T6(600ms-3s) 2005/11/19 03:14 RB Y Unknown Unknown Unknown 
D1(0-<30%) T3(70-<100ms) 2005/11/19 03:24 RB Y Transmission Nevis Snowdon No2 275kV Line Bird Related 
D2(30-<40%) T4(100-<150ms) 2005/11/27 13:07 WB X1 Transmission Matla Nevis No2 275kV Line Bird Related 
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ANNEXURE C: 
STEEL PLANT NETWORK SIMULATION DATA 
 
Description 










Simmerpan / Germiston Factories 1 88kV 3.05 0.0384 0.1400 0.1520 0.1370 
Simmerpan / Germiston Factories 2 88kV 3.05 0.0384 0.1400 0.1520 0.1370 
Germiston Factories / Germiston 1 East 44kV 0.27 0.0388 0.1108 0.1003 0.0562 
Germiston Factories / Germiston 2 East 44kV 0.27 0.0388 0.1108 0.1003 0.0562 
Germiston Factories / South West Vertical 1 44kV  0.51 0.0388 0.1108 0.1003 0.0562 
Germiston Factories / South West Vertical 2 44kV  0.51 0.0388 0.1108 0.1003 0.0562 
South West Vertical / SAR Germiston 1 44kV 1.46 0.1010 0.0820 0.3400 0.1070 
South West Vertical / SAR Germiston 2 44kV 1.46 0.1010 0.0820 0.3400 0.1070 
South West Vertical / Simmer & Jack 44kV 6.81 0.1010 0.0820 0.3400 0.1070 
South West Vertical / SAR Geldenhuis 44kV 6.81 0.1010 0.0820 0.3400 0.1070 
Simmer & Jack / SAR Geldenhuis 44kV 0.45 0.1010 0.0820 0.3400 0.1070 
South West Vertical / SAR Angelo 44kV 4.15 0.1471 0.3717 0.4414 1.4791 
Hercules Shaft / SAR Angelo 44kV 2.56 0.1471 0.3717 0.4414 1.4791 
Hercules Shaft / SAR Boksburg Tee 44kV 4.96 0.1471 0.3717 0.4414 1.4791 
Hercules Shaft / Angelo 44kV 3.96 0.1471 0.3717 0.4414 1.4791 
Hercules Shaft / Cason Mill - SAR Boksburg 44kV 0.09 0.1471 0.3717 0.4414 1.4791 
Angelo / Cason Mill 44kV 2.07 0.1471 0.3717 0.4414 1.4791 
SAR Boksburg Tee / Cason Mill 44kV 2.44 0.1471 0.3717 0.4414 1.4791 
Germiston Factories / Hercules Shaft 44kV 10.88 0.1471 0.3717 0.4414 1.4791 
Simmerpan / Germiston Munic 1 88kV 2.15 0.0384 0.1400 0.1520 0.1370 
Simmerpan / Germiston Munic 2 88kV 2.15 0.0384 0.1400 0.1520 0.1370 
Simmerpan / Germiston Munic 3 88kV 2.15 0.0384 0.1400 0.1520 0.1370 
Tailings Booster / SAR Rooikop Tee 88kV 0.44 0.0388 0.1108 0.1003 0.0562 
Germiston South / Tailings Booster - SAR Rooikop Tee 88kV 1.94 0.1471 0.3717 0.4414 1.4791 
Germiston South / SAR Rooikop Tee 88kV 0.05 0.1471 0.3717 0.4414 1.4791 
Union DS / Germiston South 88kV 2.04 0.0721 0.5990 0.3568 1.5147 
Germiston South / Mill Scaw 88kV 2.05 0.0721 0.5990 0.3568 1.5147 
Union DS / Mill Scaw 88kV 0.17 0.0697 0.3485 0.3717 1.4636 
Union DS / SAR Katlehong 88kV 3.7 0.2013 0.3795 0.5034 1.4868 
SAR Katlehong / Aero Tee 88kV 1.35 0.2013 0.3795 0.5034 1.4868 
Aero Tee / Union DS 88kV 0.23 0.2013 0.3795 0.5034 1.4868 
SAR Katlehong / Union DS - Aero Tee 88kV 0.1 0.0697 0.3485 0.3717 1.4636 
Union DS / Wadeville 1 44kV 3.91 0.1010 0.0820 0.3400 0.1070 
Union DS / Wadeville 2 44kV 3.91 0.1010 0.0820 0.3400 0.1070 
Union DS / Console Glass 1 44kV 1.35 0.1588 0.4414 0.4066 1.5140 
Union DS / Console Glass 2 44kV 3.98 0.1588 0.4414 0.4066 1.5140 
Console Glass / Wadeville 44kV 1.64 0.1588 0.4414 0.4066 1.5140 
Console Glass / MC Kechnie 1 44kV 1.97 0.1588 0.4414 0.4066 1.5140 
Console Glass / MC Kechnie 2 44kV 1.97 0.1588 0.4414 0.4066 1.5140 
Simmerpan / Jack Shaft Tee 1 88kV 1.73 0.0303 0.2360 0.3116 1.0761 
Simmerpan / Jack Shaft Tee 2 88kV 1.91 0.0303 0.2360 0.3116 1.0761 
Simmerpan / Jupiter - Jack Shaft 1 88kV 0.14 0.1471 0.3717 0.4414 1.0761 
Simmerpan / Jupiter - Jack Shaft 2 88kV 0.09 0.1471 0.3717 0.4414 1.0761 
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Jupiter / Jack Shaft Tee 1 88kV 2.41 0.0303 0.2360 0.3116 1.0761 
Jupiter / Jack Shaft Tee 2 88kV 2.24 0.0303 0.2360 0.3116 1.0761 
Jupiter / Union 1 88kV 11.12 0.0387 0.2943 0.3407 1.4017 




Description MVA HV Side MV Side % Impedance 
Volts / 
Tap Min Position Max Position Neutral Tap 
Simmerpan 88/11kV Trf 1 88 11 30 11.2 1.25 1 17 5 
Simmerpan 88/11kV Trf 2 88 11 30 11.2 1.25 1 17 5 
Germiston Factories Trf 1 88 44 80 3 1.25 1 17 5 
Union DS 88/11 Trf 1 45 88 44 8.2 1.25 1 17 5 
Union DS 88/11 Trf 2 45 88 44 8.2 1.25 1 17 5 




Description MW MVAr 
SAR Geldenhuis 44kV 1.3 0.6 
Simmer & Jack 2.2kV 0.4 0.4 
Simmer & Jack 6.6kV 0.5 0.2 
Cason Mill 3.3kV 5.5 4.6 
Angelo 3.3kV 3 0.8 
SAR Angelo 44kV 1 0.4 
Hercules Shaft 3.3kV 10.7 4 
Hercules Shaft 6.6kV 5.1 3.3 
South West Vertical 3.3kV 0.7 0.4 
South West Vertical 6.6kV 0.5 0.7 
SAR Rooikop 44kV 0.4 0.3 
Tailings Booster 6.6kV 1.1 0.7 
Germiston Munic 33kV 44.8 0 
Mill Scaw 88kV 35.9 8.5 
Germiston South 88kV 135.9 28.4 
SAR Katlehong 88kV 1.8 0.6 
Aero 88kV 7.6 2 
Jack Shaft 88kV 0.1 0 





















PULP & PLANT NETWORK SIMULATION DATA 
 
Circuit 
Total Line Length 
(km) r' (Ω/km) x' (Ω/km) r0 (Ω/km) x0 (Ω/km) 
Nevis / Modder East Tee 132kV 14.42 0.0580 0.5957 0.3427 1.5112 
Modder East Tee / Benoni DS 1 132kV 15.25 0.0580 0.5957 0.3427 1.5112 
Nevis / Benoni DS - Modder Tee 132kV 0.38 0.0580 0.5957 0.3427 1.5112 
Nevis / Sappi 132kV 13.64 0.0580 0.5957 0.3427 1.5112 
Sappi / Enstra 132kV 2.17 0.0580 0.5957 0.3427 1.5112 
Enstra / Modder East Tee 132kV 4.82 0.0580 0.5957 0.3427 1.5112 
Enstra / Benoni DS - Modder Tee 132kV 0.38 0.2037 0.4328 0.4873 1.3481 
Modder East Tee / Benoni DS 2 132kV 15.29 0.2037 0.4328 0.4873 1.3481 
Benoni DS / Dunswart Tee 1 44kV 10.98 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Dunswart Tee / Brakpan North 44kV 0.04 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Benoni DS / Brakpan North - Dunswart Tee 44kV 7.77 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
Benoni DS / SAR Apex - Dunswart 44kV 3.46 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Benoni DS / Dunswart Tee 2 44kV 2.80 0.0744 0.1084 0.1572 0.0533 
Dunswart Tee / SAR Apex 44kV 5.07 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
SAR Apex / Modder Shaft Tee 44kV 4.75 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
SAR Apex / Ergo Booster - Modder Shaft Tee 44kV 0.13 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
Modder Shaft Tee / Ergo Booster 44kV 4.46 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
Brakpan North / Ergo Booster 44kV 3.72 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Nevis / Struben DS 1 132kV 0.33 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
Nevis / Struben DS 2 132kV 0.33 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
Struben DS / Welgedacht Town 44kV 7.98 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
Welgedacht Town / SAR Welgedacht Tee 44kV 0.53 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
SAR Welgedacht Tee / Welgedacht 0.40 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
Welgedacht Town / Welgedacht - SAR Welgedacht Tee 44kV 0.05 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Welgedacht Town / SAR Cowles 44kV 4.40 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
SAR Cowles / East Geduld Refinery 44kV 3.34 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
East Geduld Refinery / Ergo Geduld 44kV 1.10 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
East Geduld Shaft / East Geduld Refinery 44kV 2.20 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Struben DS / East Geduld Shaft 44kV 12.46 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
Struben DS / Grootvlei Shaft 44kV 8.20 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Grootvlei Shaft / East Geduld Mine 44kV 4.88 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Grootvlei Three / East Geduld Mine 44kV 6.44 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Palmiet South / Grootvlei Three 44kV 3.61 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Palmiet South / Astonlake Tee 44kV 0.47 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Astonlake Tee / Struben 44kV 1.62 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Palmiet South / Struben DS - Astonlake Tee 44kV 0.02 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Struben DS / Holfontein & SABC Welgadacht Tee 44kV 6.70 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Holfontein & SABC Welgedacht Tee / SAR Sundra 44kV 1.16 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Struben DS / SAR Sundra - Holfontein & SABC Welgedacht Tee 44kV 0.41 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
SABC Welgedacht Tee 44kV 0.02 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Holfontein Tee 44kV 3.89 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Struben DS Tee / Endicott 44kV 11.40 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
Endicott Tee 44kV 0.02 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
Struben / Endicott Tee - RWB Bloemendal / Uitkyk Tee 4.52 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
RWB Bloemendal Tee 44kV 0.40 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
Uitkyk Tee 44kV 9.74 0.1441 0.2062 0.2761 0.6682 
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Blesbok Tee 44kV 2.86 0.2033 0.4027 0.4927 1.4520 
Struben DS / Delmas DS 132kV 17.72 0.1155 0.4227 0.3950 1.3242 
Struben DS / Umbilo Tee 132kV 20.33 0.1155 0.4227 0.3950 1.3242 
Umbilo Tee / Delmas DS 132kV 4.44 0.1155 0.4227 0.3950 1.3242 
Struben DS / Delmas DS - Umbilo Tee 132kV 0.06 0.1155 0.4227 0.3950 1.3242 
Struben DS / Springs Bulk 132kV 15.40 0.5785 0.3480 0.3382 1.2803 
Springs Bulk / Springs Munic 132kV 6.58 0.5785 0.3480 0.3382 1.2803 
Springs Munic / Struben DS 132kV 12.71 0.5785 0.3480 0.3382 1.2803 
Delmas DS / SAR Druden 44kV 9.62 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Delmas DS / Sundra Rural 44kV 11.30 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Sundra Rural / SAR Eloff 44kV 0.68 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Delmas / Dryden Rural - Sundra Rural Tee 44kV 0.23 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Delmas DS / Sundra Rural Tee 44kV 3.60 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Sundra Rural Tee / Dryden Rural 44kV 0.03 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Delmas DS / SAR Eloff 44kV 10.61 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Delmas DS / Delmas Munic 1 44kV 3.60 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 
Delmas DS / Delmas Munic 2 44kV 3.56 0.1452 0.4008 0.4046 1.4810 




Description HV Side MV Side Tertiary MVA 
% 
Impedance Volts / Tap Min Position Max Position Neutral Tap 
Delmas DS 132/44kV Trf 1 132 44   90 10.6 1.43 1 10 4 
Delmas DS 132/44kV Trf 2 132 44   90 10.6 1.43 1 10 4 
Struben DS 132/44kV Trf 1 132 44   50 10.4 1.25 1 17 5 
Struben DS 132/44kV Trf 2 132 44   50 10.4 1.25 1 17 5 
Benoni DS 132/44kV Trf 1 132 44   90 10.8 1.25 1 17 5 
Benoni DS 132/44kV Trf 2 132 44   90 10.8 1.25 1 17 5 
Nevis TS 275/132/11kV Trf 1 275 132 11 500 12.6 1.25 1 17 5 
 
 
Description MW MVAr 
Sappi 6.6kV 24.7 7.4 
Enstra 6.6kV 12.9 0 
Modder East 6.6kV 9 3.1 
Benoni DS 132kV 142 17.5 
Benoni DS 44kV 42 16 
Brakpan North 44kV 4.1 0.6 
Dunswart 44kV 2.1 1.4 
Ergo Booster 44kV 5.3 0.1 
Modder Shaft 44kV 0.8 0.3 
Wegedacht 11kV 2.3 0.3 
SAR Welgedacht 1 0.1 
Welgedacht Town 44kV 3.2 1.1 
East Geduld Shaft 44kV 0.7 0.3 
East Geduld Refinery 44kV 15.3 7.5 
Ergo Geduld 44kV 3.9 4.5 
SAR Cowles Dam 44kV 2 0.8 
East Geduld Mine 44kV 1.4 0.7 
Grootvlei Three 44kV 11.8 7.1 
Palmiet South 44kV 6.9 0 
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Grootveli Shaft 44kV 12.8 0 
Grootveli Shaft 2.2kV 3.8 2.1 
Holfontein 11kV 1.4 0.2 
SAR Sundra 44kV 0.1 0.1 
SABC Welgedacht 2.1kV 1.6 0.5 
SAR Dryden 44kV 2.7 0.9 
Sundra Rural 11kV 7.3 2.4 
Delmas Munic 44kV 11.2 3 
SAR Eloff 44kV 2.7 0.9 
Dryden Rural 11kV 5.7 1.9 
Springs Bulk 132kV 53.2 13.2 
Springs Munic 132kV 39.4 7.2 
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ANNEXURE E: 




Enstra QOS Presentation      











DURATION CLASS EQUIPMENT CAUSE












DURATION CLASS EQUIPMENT CAUSE
Nevis 275/132kV 6/2/2005 12:46 R 45.1 100 X2 Nevis Pieterboth No1 275kV Line Veld Fire
Nevis 275/132kV 6/2/2005 12:46 R 42.9 100 X2 Nevis Pieterboth No1 275kV Line Veld Fire
Nevis 275/132kV 6/7/2005 05:43 B 40 120 X1 Matla Nevis No2 275kV Line Bird Pollution
Nevis 275/132kV 6/29/2005 04:31 W 31.6 80 X1 Pieterboth Snowdon No1 275kV Line Bird Pollution
Nevis 275/132kV 6/29/2005 05:48 W 31.5 80 X1 Pieterboth Snowdon No1 275kV Line Bird Pollution
Nevis 275/132kV 7/21/2005 08:29 RWB 57.3 250 S Matla Esselen 275kV Line Under investigation







• Installation of Bird Guards and Bird Flappers on 275kV lines is ongoing nationally.
• Matla – Nevis 1 & 2 project to in October 2005.
• Nevis – Snowdon 1 in October 2005.
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DURATION CLASS EQUIPMENT CAUSE
Benoni Bulk 132kV 6/2/2005 12:46 RWB 32 100 X1 Nevis Pieterboth No1 275kV Line Veld Fire
Benoni Bulk 132kV 6/7/2005 05:44 RB 32.7 120 X1 Matla Nevis No2 275kV Line Bird Pollution





DURATION CLASS EQUIPMENT CAUSE









Enstra Monthly Voltage Dips
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Enstra Annualized Voltage Dips
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ANNEXURE F: 
NEW PROPOSED DIP COMMUNICATION APPROACH  
 
Note 1: 




Sprunt and Minaar are the authors of the presentation. The author of this thesis conducted the 
analysis of dip data (graphs) that was presented by Sprunt and Minaar, using Excel, Event 
Viewer, NEPS and TIPPS. The reasons for involvement of Sprunt and Minaar are as follows: 
 This research study forms part of a series of studies on power quality. Sprunt, Minaar, Koch 
and the author of this thesis, were members of the power quality study group that oversees 
these studies, at the time of commencement of this research. 
 On the day of the presentation, it was logistically feasible for Sprunt and Minaar to present dip 
analysis results to the customer due to base locations (Minnaar – based in Germiston, Sprunt 
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Enstra QMS Report
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BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV Overhead
Line
SAPPI / TEE 1 132kV CONDUCTOR
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR
NEVIS / SAPPI 1 132kV BKR
Matla Nevis No1 275kV Line
SAPPI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR
STRUBEN DS / SAR SUNDRA -
HOLFONTEIN TEE 1 44kV BUSBAR
ISOLATOR 1
STRUBEN DS / GROOTVLEI SHAFT 1
44kV BKR
BENONI / ENSTRA 1 132kV HV
Overhead Line
NIGEL TERMINAL / SAR NIGEL 1 88kV
BKR
Benburg Esselen No1 275kV Fdr Bay
SAPPI 132/6.6KV SUBSTATION
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV
CONDUCTOR
ENSTRA / METER PANEL 1 6.6kV BKR
MODDER EAST / TEE 1 132kV
CONDUCTOR
Sappi- Enstra 132kV line
BENONI / ENSTRA 1 132kV BKR












































































































BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV Overhead
Line
SAPPI / TEE 1 132kV CONDUCTOR
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR
Atlas Snowdon No2 275kV Line
NEVIS / SAPPI 1 132kV BKR
Matla Nevis No1 275kV Line
SAPPI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR
STRUBEN DS / SAR SUNDRA -
HOLFONTEIN TEE 1 44kV BUSBAR
STRUBEN DS / GROOTVLEI SHAFT 1
44kV BKR
BENONI / ENSTRA 1 132kV HV
Overhead Line
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV
CONDUCTOR
NIGEL TERMINAL / SAR NIGEL 1 88kV
BKR
SAPPI 132/6.6KV SUBSTATION
MODDER EAST / TEE 2 132kV
CONDUCTOR
Matla Nevis No2 275kV Line
Benoni-Farramere 132kV cable
Town-Morehill 132kV cable
ENSTRA / METER PANEL 1 6.6kV BKR
MODDER EAST / TEE 1 132kV
CONDUCTOR
Sappi- Enstra 132kV line
BENONI / ENSTRA 1 132kV BKR
Pieterboth Snowdon No1 275kV Line






















































































BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV Overhead
Line
SAPPI / TEE 1 132kV CONDUCTOR
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR
NEVIS / SAPPI 1 132kV BKR
SAPPI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR
STRUBEN DS / SAR SUNDRA -
HOLFONTEIN TEE 1 44kV BUSBAR
ISOLATOR 1
STRUBEN DS / GROOTVLEI SHAFT 1
44kV BKR
BENONI / ENSTRA 1 132kV HV
Overhead Line
Sappi- Enstra 132kV line
Benburg Esselen No1 275kV Fdr Bay
SAPPI 132/6.6KV SUBSTATION
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV
CONDUCTOR











































































BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV HV Overhead
Line
SAPPI / TEE 1 132kV CONDUCTOR
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR
Atlas Snowdon No2 275kV Line
BENONI / NEVIS 1 132kV
CONDUCTOR
Matla Nevis No1 275kV Line
SAPPI / NEVIS 1 132kV BKR
STRUBEN DS / SAR SUNDRA -
HOLFONTEIN TEE 1 44kV BUSBAR
STRUBEN DS / GROOTVLEI SHAFT 1
44kV BKR
BENONI / ENSTRA 1 132kV HV
Overhead Line
NIGEL TERMINAL / SAR NIGEL 1 88kV
BKR
Sappi- Enstra 132kV line
Pieterboth Snowdon No1 275kV Line
Atlas Snowdon No1 275kV Line
SAPPI 132/6.6KV SUBSTATION
MODDER EAST / TEE 2 132kV
CONDUCTOR
Esselen Kruispunt - Matla No1 275kV
Line
Matla Nevis No2 275kV Line
Benoni-Farramere 132kV cable
Town-Morehill 132kV cable
Duvha Vulcan No1 400kV Line
MODDER EAST / TEE 1 132kV
CONDUCTOR
BENONI / ENSTRA 1 132kV BKR
Nevis Pieterboth No1 275kV Line

































































































   
 















Theft Conductor Veld Fire Conductor
Related




New Class (All) Year (All)
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